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ABSTRACT
The worldwide problem with pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security systems isn’t just financial. This
study indicates that these systems may have exerted adverse effects on key demographic factors,
private savings, and long-term growth rates. Through a comprehensive endogenous-growth model
where human capital is the engine of growth, family choices affect human capital formation, and
family formation itself is a choice variable, we show that social security taxes and benefits can create
adverse incentive effects on family formation and subsequent household choices, and that these
effects cannot be fully neutralized by counteracting intergenerational transfers within families. We
implement the model using calibrated simulations as well as panel data from 57 countries over 32
years (1960-92). We find that PAYG tax measures account for a sizeable part of the downward
trends in family formation and fertility worldwide, and for a slowdown in the rates of savings and












Social security has become a subject of intense policy concern because of its financial 
vulnerability. This paper focuses on a related, but no less important issue: social security’s 
impact on demographic trends and economic growth. Data from 57 countries show, for example, 
that the average annual marriage net of divorce rate per 1000 people age 15 and over fell from 
9.72 in 1960 to 6.40 in 1990, and that average total fertility rate fell from 3.82 in 1965 to 2.07 in 
1989. These dramatic changes reflect secular trends common to all countries. Our theoretical and 
empirical analyses indicate that the defined-benefits, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security 
systems operating in most countries have independently contributed to these trends. 
To start from the end: we study a panel of 57 countries over the period 1960-1992. 
Controlling for a host of other contributing factors we find that the ratio of social security’s pension 
benefits to GDP, which approximates the system’s equilibrium tax rate (PEN), has adverse effects 
on: a. the rate of marriage net of divorce − decreasing marriage and increasing divorce; b. the total 
fertility rate; c. the private savings rate; and d. schooling attainment measures and per-capita GDP 
growth rates. These effects are especially large for family formation and fertility, and in OECD 
countries; they are not duplicated when PEN is replaced by a benefits measure that includes other 
welfare programs; and they are generally not observed in countries where social security is a 
provident fund, rather than a defined-benefits, PAYG system. 
The insights we offer to rationalize these effects are based on a model of endogenous 
growth where human capital is the engine of growth, family choices affect fertility, investment in 
children’s education, and savings, and family formation itself is a choice variable. Theoretically, 
we focus on the way the scale of the PAYG system, as indicated by the level of taxes and defined 
benefits, affects family decisions. In this regard, our paper generalizes the theoretical formulation 
in Becker and Barro [BB] (1988), which does not allow for human capital formation and   2
endogenous growth, and in Ehrlich and Lui [EL] (1998), which does not model family formation 
as a separate choice variable and is based on a narrower specification of altruism. 
The possible effects of PAYG systems on fertility especially, but savings and human 
capital formation as well, were analyzed in several previous studies, which reach varying 
conclusions depending on whether all three variables are examined in a dynamic context,
1 
whether parents are motivated purely by altruism, and on the way the parent’s utility from 
children is formalized.
2 All implicitly share a common conclusion, however, which is a central 
proposition in EL (1998): exogenous increases in PAYG taxes must have adverse effects on at 
least one of these three choice variables. We go beyond all previous studies by considering, in 
addition to all three family choices, the impact of social security taxes on net family formation.
3 
This formulation allows for a more complete measurement of tax effects on all household 
choices, and it uncovers different welfare implications for single and married households.  
We base our central propositions on a benchmark OLG model of altruistic parents, which 
produces unequivocal adverse effects of social security taxes on family formation and fertility. 
By expanding this model to recognize private alternatives to public social security – household 
savings and old-age transfers from children to parents – we show that social security may also 
affect adversely aggregate savings and human capital formation. These results remain valid even 
if we reformulate the model in a dynastic setting, which allows for intergenerational transfers 
going from children to old parents or vice versa (bequest). Since our comprehensive dynamic 
structure does not have closed-form solutions, we test the model’s implications using calibrated 
simulations. We then corroborate the results of these simulations using the international panel 
data mentioned above. Although our theoretical model treats social security taxes and benefits as 
exogenous policy variables, empirically we allow for their possible endogeneity as well.   3
Our extended model suggests that exogenous increases in PAYG social security tax rates 
can be expected to impact adversely net family formation and at least one of the family’s 
subsequent choices: fertility, savings, and educational investments. Our emphasis on the role of 
family formation in framing subsequent household choices produces additional insights: a. The 
net effect of social security taxes on the total fertility rate owes to their separate effects on family 
formation and on fertility decisions within families (given that most children are born within 
married households); b. Their impact on savings can vary significantly across “married” and 
“single” households; c. They have different welfare implications for married and single agents. 
Our model also suggests that higher social taxes crowd out intergenerational transfers going from 
children to old parents – the traditional family security system.   
While both our calibrated simulations and regression analyses estimate relatively larger 
adverse tax effects on family formation and total fertility rate, they also confirm the existence of 
adverse effects on long-term growth rates and savings, which have been disputed issues in the 
literature (see footnote 1). Both analyses also indicate that these effects are larger where taxes 
and benefits levels are relatively high, and in advanced, relative to developing economies.   
The basic source of these effects is an externality inherent in the PAYG system. The old-
age benefits are “defined”: they are fixed at the individual level, largely independently of one’s 
own contributions, and certainly independently of one’s children’s contributions, or whether one 
has any children. Therefore, individuals have little incentive to take such contributions into 
account in making fertility, investment, or savings decisions, and the incentive to form a family 
is affected by the implicit subsidy defined benefits provide to single (childless) households.  
I. The Model  
We consider a closed economy with competitive product and labor markets and workers 
of homogeneous capacity and fixed labor supplies.
4 Workers differ, however, in  some   4
idiosyncratic attributes that affect their matching prospects, which is why in equilibrium not all 
form families. We also limit search for a potential partner to a single period at the start of 
adulthood, by the end of which each worker winds up either “married” or “single”. “Search”, 
consisting of efforts to find and bond with a match, raises the probability of marriage, p, which 
we assume for convenience to be a prerequisite for having children. We assume that family 
formation decisions and all subsequent lifetime choices are based on rational expectations. 
  The engine of growth in this economy is human capital, and its accumulation is based on a 
production technology linking parents’ human capital and investment in children’s education with 
the human capital formed in the latter (as in Becker et al., 1990 and EL, 1991, 1998): 
(1) Ht+1 = A(H+Ht)ht
µ. 
In equation (1), H denotes raw labor, ht (∈ [0,1]) is the fraction of the production capacity parents 
invest in the human capital (“quality”) of each child, Ht+1, and A captures technological or 
environmental factors enhancing effective intergenerational transmission of knowledge. For 
computational convenience, but without loss of generality, we henceforth set µ= 1. 
  Our analysis builds on the overlapping-generations (OLG) framework in EL (1991), since 
this facilitates handling the family-formation choice. We recognize three overlapping generations: 
dependent children, working young adults, and retired old adults. We first analyze the interaction 
between social security and household choices in a benchmark case where the choice variables are 
marriage and the quantity and quality of children, and parents are motivated strictly by altruism. We 
then extend the model to allow for savings and old-age support from children as private 
alternatives to public social security. We also reformulate the model in a dynastic setting where the 
direction of intergenerational transfers (old-age support v. bequest) is determined endogenously. 
  The objective of the working young adult is to maximize expected lifetime utility function:    5
(2) W(t) = U(C0(t)) + ptVm
*(t) + (1-pt)Vs
*(t),  
where pt denotes the probability of a successful marriage, and Vm
*(t) and Vs
*(t) denote the 
maximized expected lifetime utilities if the person winds up married or single, respectively. The 
term U(C0(t)) in equation (2) denotes the utility of consumption during the single search-for-a-
mate period when the young adult is already in full possession of the earning capacity (H+H t) 
generated by parents. Search concludes in that period.  Hence  
(3) C0(t) = (H+H t)(1-λ(pt)),   
where λ(p) is the fraction of production capacity spent on search. The probability of a successful 
marriage, p = p(λ), is a continuously increasing and concave function of λ, with p(1) ≤1. Its 
inverse function λ(p) is thus increasing and convex, with λ(0)=0.
5 The utility operator in each 
period is U(C) = [1/(1−σ)][C
1−σ−1], with 0<σ≤1.  
1.  The optimization problem 
Optimization involves a two-step procedure. In the first, one maximizes the expected 
lifetime utilities, Vm
*(t) and Vs
*(t), conditional on being either a successfully married parent, or 
single and childless. In the second, the marriage decision is resolved. 
A. If married, the young adult thus maximizes the expected utility associated with parenthood: 
(4) Vm




(5) Cm1(t) = (H+H t)(1−vnt −htnt −θ),  
(6) Cm2(t+1) = St+1, and 
(7) Cm3(t+1) = B(π1nt)
β(H+ H t+1)
α,  with β > α = 1.  
In equation (5), Cm1(t) and nt represent the consumption and number of children of a 
young parent (treated as a continuous variable), while v and ht denote the uniform cost of raising 
and educating each child as fractions of production capacity, (H+H t). The competitive wage per   6
unit of (H+H t) is normalized as 1. The policy variable θ is the PAYG system’s tax rate on 
earning capacity, π1 and π2 denote probabilities of survival from childhood to adulthood and from 
adulthood to old age, and δ is a discount factor. In the benchmark model, social security is the 
only means of providing old-age insurance. The consumption of a parent at old age, Cm2(t+1) in 
equation (6), thus equals the equilibrium social security benefit, St+1, in equation (11) below.   
In equation (7), the term Cm3(t+1)=B(π1nt)
β(H+ H t+1)
α, with α = 1, defines the “altruism 
function” in the context of our OLG framework, whereby parents derive utility vicariously from the 
potential income and expected number of surviving offspring, π1nt (we later allow for children’s 
non-survival as well). This specification is analogous to that of altruism in dynastic models. To 
ensure interior solutions in both fertility and educational investment, it is necessary that β>α=1, 
otherwise quality would dominate quantity of children in a growth-equilibrium steady state because 
quantity always has a higher marginal cost than quality if educational investments apply to all 
children. To ensure the concavity of equation (4), we must further restrict β(1-σ)<1. 
B. If single, the young adult maximizes a strictly “selfish” expected utility function: 
(8)   Vs




(9)   Cs1(t) = (H+H t)(1 −θ),  
(10) Cs2(t+1) = St+1,  
and Cs3(t+1) is zero for singles. 
We assume that PAYG social security is a strictly defined-benefits system: all adults, 
regardless of marital status, pay the same taxes and enjoy the same defined benefits. In the 
benchmark model, therefore, Cs(t+1)=Cm(t+1). Since only children born to married agents 
contribute to social security, the balanced-budget defined benefits per recipient are given by: 
(11)  St+1 = pt(π1/π2)ntθ(H+H t+1).     7
2. The family formation decision, subsequent choices, and equilibrium outcomes 
By the economic approach to marriage (see Becker 1993), being married “pays” relative 
to staying single, i.e., Vm
*(t) > Vs
*(t), because of parental rewards from children – marriage’s 
unique product. Given the solutions for Vm
*(t) and Vs
*(t), the optimal probability of marriage, pt, 
is determined by maximizing equation (2) with respect to pt. The first order condition is:  
(12)  ∆(t) ≡ [Vm
*(t) – Vs
*(t)] – φ(pt) (H+ H t)
1−σ = 0.
6  
The marginal benefit of pt is the utility differential from being married rather than single, and 
φ(pt) ≡ [1–λ(pt)]
−σλ′(pt) is its marginal cost per unit of production capacity. Optimal pt is positive 
and unique, as φ(0)=0 and φ(p) is rising with p. Since young adults in the economy have identical 
search costs and matching odds, the marriage market clears probabilistically: the value of p, 
which equates equation (2) across all young adults ex-ante, is equal to the ex-post fraction of 
married adults. Optimal p also depends, however, on the equilibrium values of fertility and 
human capital investments, which are dictated by married households. 










σ ≡ δRmh.                                        
In equations (13) and (14), the LHS terms denote the marginal rate of substitution in consumption 
between adulthood and old age, and Rmi, i = n, h, denote the monetary equivalents of expected rates 
of psychic returns on investments in the quantity and quality of children. Optimal pt, ht and nt must 
satisfy simultaneously equations (12), (13), and (14). In these equations, however, social security 
benefits are taken as exogenous. Equilibrium solutions at the aggregate, or representative-agent 
level, must also incorporate the feedback effects of the micro-level solutions for pt, ht and nt on the 
equilibrium level of benefits, as governed by equation (11). These are derived below.   8
Note, first, that the equilibrium solutions for our control variables determine the economy’s 
“development” prospects, which are dictated by the marginal rate of human capital formation. Two 
stable regimes can be shown to exist in the benchmark model: a. a stagnant steady state where h*=0, 
so there is no human capital formation or economic growth (a Malthusian trap); b. a growth 
equilibrium regime where Aht* sufficiently exceeds 1, which converges on a steady state of 
perpetual growth. Whether the economy is stuck in the first, or can take off to the second steady 
state, is dictated by growth-enhancing parameters – in the benchmark case, essentially A, B, β, and 
v. Since our empirical data relate to developing economies exhibiting persistent growth, we focus 
henceforth on interior solutions for all our control variables.
7 In this case the benchmark model 
yields a closed-form equilibrium solution for ht, based on equations (13) and (14): 
(15)  ht = v/(β−1) − H/[ A ( β−1) (H+ H t)]. 
In a steady state of growth, the equilibrium rate of investment in human capital thus becomes 
ht=h*=ν/(β–1). Two propositions follow:  
Proposition 1.  Absent savings or intergenerational transfers, an exogenous increase in the social 
security tax rate, θ, will lower the equilibrium quantity of children in a stable growth regime, nt, 
while leaving unchanged their quality, ht.  
Proof. In equation (15) equilibrium ht is independent of θ all along its dynamic path. By 
equations (13) and (15), we thus have: 
(16)  (dnt /dθ) = 1/{−(v+ht) − Ψ[1−β(1−σ)] nt
[1−β(1−σ)−σ]/σ/σ}<0, 
where Ψ = (δπ2β)
−1/σ (v+ht)
1/σ [B(π1)
β (H+ H t+1) /(H+ H t)]
1−1/σ > 0. Since stability conditions 
require that β(1-σ)<1 and σ>0, equation (16) must be negative. Indeed, in the log utility case,  
nt= n*= δπ2β(β−1)(1−θ) A(H+ H t) / (1+δπ2β) /[βvA(H+ H t) − H], confirming the proposition.     9
Proposition 2.  Absent savings or intergenerational transfers, an increase in the social security tax 
rate, θ, will lower the equilibrium probability of marriage, pt. 
Proof. Differentiating equation (12) totally with respect to θ and pt, we obtain 
(17)  (dpt /dθ) = [−Cm1(t)
−σ + Cs1(t)
−σ + (dnt/dθ)Ω]/φ′(pt), 
where Ω ≡ θ ∂ ∂ /
*




β-1(H+ H t+1)/(H+ H t) = 0 by the 
envelope theorem. Since φ′(pt)>0, and the consumption level of parents raising children is lower 
than that of singles (Cm1(t) < Cs1(t)),  the sign of dpt /dθ is negative. 
  These propositions imply that any increase in the social security tax lowers the entire 
dynamic paths of fertility and family formation, not just the latter’s steady-state values. The 
underlying reason is that individual parents cannot internalize the impact of aggregate marriages 
and educational attainments of all children on equilibrium defined benefits per recipient, since 
one’s defined benefits do not depend on the number or quality of one’s own children, or by 
whether one has any children. In contrast, the tax is levied in proportion to household earnings, 
and is thus a greater burden on families who raise and educate more children. This externality 
lowers the marginal benefits from children or from forming a family rather than staying single.  
  Proposition 1 and especially the implication that ht is unresponsive to tax changes stem 
from specifying altruism in equation (7) as a function of the expected number of surviving 
children. If uncertainty in the survival of children were formally recognized, all choice 
variables would become vulnerable to adverse tax effects (see Appendix A.1). This is also the 
case when we allow any one of the extensions below. 
3. Introducing savings opportunities and family-based old-age insurance 
  We now extend the benchmark model to allow for both savings opportunities and an 
informal family-security system in which old parents partly rely on adult children for old-age   10
support and care. We pursue these extensions, as well as a related extension allowing for bequest in 
section 4, to determine whether the existence of either one of these “private” alternatives to social 
security can neutralize the tax effect on family formation or fertility, as in section 2. In this context, 
however, we also explore specific repercussions for savings and intergenerational transfers.  
  For simplicity, we introduce opportunities to save for old age consumption via a home-
production function Fj=D(H+ H t)
1−κ[(H+ H t)sj]
κ, where 0<κ<1, and sj denotes the savings rate for 
married or single agents (j=m,n): Old agents use their production capacity to convert accumulated 
savings, Kjt ≡ (H+ H t)sj, which fully depreciate within one generation, to old-age consumption. This 
simple specification enables us to avoid modeling a distinct capital market, while capturing the idea 
that the rate of return from physical capital in a closed economy is subject to diminishing returns.  
  The incentive to form an implicit family-security system arises from the investment parents 
make in their children’s human capital (see equation 1). If such investments are productive, there is 
thus a mutual benefit for parents and children to reach a sharing arrangement based on implicit 
contracts. EL (1991) specify sufficient conditions under which such implicit contracts can be time- 
consistent, and show that the optimal sharing arrangement is proportional to the human capital 
attainments parents help produce.
8 To simplify the insurance system, we assume that all siblings, 
whether single or married, form an extended-family insurance pool in which intergenerational 
transfers are actuarially fair and default-free.
9 This assumption is relaxed in Appendix A.1. 
  The consumption flows at adulthood and old age in this extended model become: 
(5′)   Cm1(t) = (H+H t)(1−vnt −htnt −smt −θ) − π2wtHt, and 
(6′)   Cm2(t+1) = π1ntwt+1Ht+1 + D(H+ H t)
1−κ[(H+ H t)smt]
κ + St+1, for married agents; and 
(9′)   Cs1(t) = (H+H t)(1−sst −θ) − π2wtHt, and 
(10′) Cs2(t+1) = D(H+  H t)
1−κ[(H+  H t)sst]
κ + St+1, for single agents,   11
where w is the optimal sharing rule and π2wtHt is the actuarially fair rate of transfer of benefits to 
old parents. In equation (6′) old age consumption by a surviving parent, Cm2(t+1), now combines 
transfers from surviving children, income from savings, and social security benefits, St+1.  Single 
agents contribute to their parents’ old-age support, but receive no old-age support themselves 
since they have no children. They do secure, however, additional old-age income via savings.  
  The first order optimization conditions for married agents become 
(13′)  [Cm2(t+1)/Cm1(t)]
σ > δAπ1π2wt+1[1+βNt
*(H+ H t+1)/Ht+1]/[1+(v/ht)] ≡ δRmn, 
(14′)  [Cm2(t+1)/Cm1(t)]
σ > δAπ1π2wt+1(1+αNt
*) ≡ δRmh,  
(18)  [Cm2(t+1)/Cm1(t)]
σ > δπ2Dκ/smt
1−κ ≡ δRms,  
and the optimal parental support rate, wt+1,is determined so as to satisfy 
(19) dW(t+1)/dwt+1 = [∂W(t+1)/∂Ht+1] [∂Ht+1/∂wt+1] + ∂W(t+1)/∂wt+1 = 0.  
In equations (13′) and (14′), Nt
*≡ Cm2
σCm3
1−σ/[π1wt+1nt(H+ H t+1)] is the ratio of psychic to material 
rewards. The rates of return to children’s quantity (n) and quality (h) thus include both an old-age 
insurance benefit, and a purely altruistic reward. Also, investment in children does not rule out 
savings, given that the latter is initially productive, i.e., that Rms(sm=0) > Rmn = Rmh. Equation (19) 
sets a positive compensation rate for parents, w*, which maximizes equation (2) for each child. A 
formal analysis of this choice is outlined in Appendix A.2. Note that in this extended model with 
w*>0, all control variables can have interior solutions in all stable steady states, including the low-
income, stagnant equilibrium state which no longer requires zero investments in human capital. 
  For single agents, the optimal savings condition is symmetrical to that of married ones: 
(20)  [Cs2(t+1)/Cs1(t)]
σ > δπ2Dκ/sst
1−κ ≡ δRss. 
  Equilibrium solutions require that equations (13′), (14′) and (18)-(20) be satisfied along 
with social security’s balanced-budget constraint (11). These equations form a set of non-linear,   12
second-order simultaneous difference equations. Since no closed-form solutions exist, the 
equilibrium values of the model’s control variables p, n, s, h, and w must be derived through 
simulations. Table I presents calibrated simulations of the effects of once-and-for-all changes in 
the tax rate θ on these variables in a steady state of persistent growth, using US data. The 
calibration procedure is outlined in Appendix A.3.  
  Some comparative dynamic results can be proved analytically if w is given exogenously.  
Proposition 3:  The optimal rate of savings for old-age consumption is lower for young parents than 
for single adults, or sst > smt.  Proof: see Appendix A.4.  
  The rationale is simple. At zero human capital investment in children (h=0), and regardless 
of optimal n, the rate of return to parents from investment in h, Rmh in equation (14′), which is 
invariable to h, must exceed the rate of return on savings they could obtain if they chose to save the 
same amount as singles, Rss in equation (19), otherwise it would not pay to invest. Parents must thus 
have lower optimal savings and higher consumption at old age, relative to singles (Cm2>Cs2). 
Proposition 4: An increase in the social security tax rate (θ) that raises the equilibrium defined 
benefits per recipient would depress the share of married households (p), as long as young 
parents’ consumption is lower than singles’ (Cm1<Cs1).  Proof: See Appendix A.5.  
Higher parenting costs typically imply that Cm1<Cs1. An increase in θ thus lowers the utility 
of current consumption parents enjoy relative to single adults.  As long as a higher θ raises the 
equilibrium social security benefits per recipient St+1, this raises the utility of consumption for old 
single adults relative to married ones, since Cm2 > Cs2 by proposition 3. Indeed, the defined-benefits 
system generally provides a subsidy to single recipients because they share in the larger social 
security pie produced by offspring of married ones without having to bear the latter’s parenting 
costs.
 Both effects lower the welfare gain from family formation. Note, however, that in some   13
PAYG systems, non-contributing spouses may independently benefit from pension rights vested in 
contributing workers through a legal entitlement (as in the US), which our homogeneous-worker 
setting cannot recognize. A higher θ might thus also provide a marginal subsidy to marriage, and its 
net effect on family formation would depend on the relative strength of these opposing effects.  
Proposition 5:  An increase in the social security tax rate (θ) that raises the equilibrium defined 
benefits per recipient, cannot increase all of the three family-choice variables, sm, n, and h; at least 
one of these must decline, and possibly all three. This proposition implies that a higher θ 
necessarily lowers the savings rate for single agents, ss. Proof: See Appendix A.6.  
The rationale is that higher PAYG taxes and benefits raise the marginal rate of 
substitution in consumption (MRS) relative to the rates of return from children’s quantity and 
quality, and savings (equations 13′, 14′, 18). Consequently, at least one of these variables must 
be downsized in equilibrium, and this applies unambiguously to savings (the only choice 
variable) in the case of singles.
10  In this extended framework, unlike the benchmark model, 
human capital investment is no longer independent of the social security tax rate, and this is the 
case even if we recognize only savings as a private means of securing old age needs.  
Given the optimal old-age support rate, w, savings and human capital investments can be 
shown to be “complements”, in the sense that an increase in θ would affect both sm and h in the 
same direction. In contrast, fertility and human capital investments are “substitutes”, in the 
sense that a shift in θ, or the unit cost of raising children, v, affects the demand for n and h in 
opposite directions. Indeed, if a rise in θ causes a significant decline in fertility, then human 
capital formation and savings may even rise as a result. However, Appendix A.6 shows that it is 
impossible that all three family choice variables would rise. Our calibrated simulations in Table I 
invariably show that all three, as well as family formation (p), in fact fall as a result of a higher θ,   14
and the percentage decline is larger the higher is the tax rate itself. Also, a higher θ has a larger 
adverse effect on the savings rate of singles relative to parents.  
Other comparative Dynamics 
The impact of higher social security taxes on old-age support.  One can expect direct 
competition between a compulsory social insurance system and a voluntary family-security 
system. Indeed, our calibrated simulations confirm this prediction: the optimal value of w* falls 
consistently with a higher θ at the growth equilibrium steady state. By these results, social 
security has contributed to the crowding out of intergenerational transfers within families, but 
has not eliminated them, consistent with recent stylized facts.
11 We also find some evidence of 
substitution between w* and sm*: in simulations where the productivity of savings (as indicated 
by the parameter D) is low, a rise θ caused w* to fall, and sm* to actually rise.  
Comparative dynamics over the development phase: A once-and-for-all upward shock in the 
technology of producing human capital, A, or a decreases in the cost of raising a child, v, can 
produce a takeoff from a stagnant to growth equilibrium through a “development phase” linking 
the two. Over this phase family formation (p) and fertility (n), or the product of the two, pn – an 
index of “total fertility rate” – generally trend downward, while the rate of human capital 
investment trends upward. This is seen in unreported simulations charting the transitional paths 
of these variables over the development phase from an early stage of the transition (t=1) toward 
the growth equilibrium steady state (t=∞). The simulations in part B of Table 1 show the effects 
of an exogenous rise in θ at these two stages. We find that a higher θ actually exerts larger 
adverse effects on all our control variables at the more advanced stage of development.  
The impact of changes in survival probabilities: An increase in the survival probabilities from 
childhood to adulthood (π1) and from adulthood to old age (π2) raises both the altruistic and 
material benefits to parents from own and children’s survival, and thus family formation, p.   15
Their effect on other control variables is more ambiguous: higher π1 and π2 increase desired 
spending on kids, but not necessarily on both quantity and quality. A higher π2 increases the odds 
of living through old age, thus the need for savings and intergenerational transfers (w), while a 
higher π1 raises the total return on children, and can thus lower sm and w. These implications are 
confirmed in separate simulations, which we do not report in Table I to save space. 
4. The Model in a Dynastic setting  
  Do our basic propositions hold also in a dynastic framework? To recast our OLG model, we 
need to continue to recognize two relevant periods in the lifecycle of each dynasty head, to allow for 
intergenerational transfers mandated by a PAYG system, but we abstract from the family-formation 
choice (letting p=1), since it cannot be naturally integrated in a dynastic setting, and focus on the 
growth-equilibrium steady state. The value function can then be stated in its usual recursive form: 




where C1(t) = (1−vnt −htnt −st −θ −π2w)Ht,  C2(t+1) = π1ntwHt+1 + DHt
1−κ(Htst)
κ +St+1,  
Ht+1 = AHtht, and St+1 = (π1/π2)ntθHt+1. 
The value function Vt(Ht) in equation (4a), unlike that in (4), incorporates the offspring’s 
utility, rather than full income, into the dynasty head’s utility, and thus the utilities of all future 
generations as well. In a growth steady state, however, Vt(Ht), depends on the single state 
variable, Ht, since “raw” human capital H vanishes in relative importance as Ht grows without 
bound. To simplify the analysis we also take the old-age support rate, w, as given.  
The optimality conditions for interior values of the control variables st, nt, and ht are now: 
0 = −C1(t)








−σ(nt/A) + δπ1π2 ntwC2(t+1)
−σ + δπ2(π1nt)
β(1-σ)Vt+1′(Ht+1),    16





and from the functional form of equation (4a) we also know that Vt+1′(Ht+1)=(1−σ)Vt+1/Ht+1.  
It is easy to show that the optimal steady state values of h and s have an explicit relation: 
h = [v/(β−1)][Dκs
κ−1/(Dκs
κ−1 − π1wA)], which implies that they move in tandem as a result of a 
shock in θ, as is the case in our OLG model. Moreover, our simulations in Table II indicate that a 
rise in the social security tax, θ, has similar adverse effects on all family-based choices, 
essentially because the externality operating in the OLG setting applies here as well. At least one 
of the family’s choice variables must fall as a result, and by the simulations, all three do.   
Moreover, these effects hold if we assume that the dynasty head also controls the pooled 
incomes of the overlapping generations within the family. In this case, where the dynasty head 
determines the optimal values of st, nt, and ht as well as consumption allocation across co-
existing generations, the direction of optimal intergenerational transfers is implicitly determined 
endogenously (see Appendix A.7). Here too, our simulations show adverse effects of θ on all the 
control variables (see table II part iii). This underscores the fact that the impact of θ cannot be 
neutralized by Ricardian Equivalence adjustments, even in the presence of bequest.  
5. Welfare Implications 
  While the preceding versions of our general model have very similar implications about 
the impact of exogenous changes in equilibrium social security tax rates and benefits, they do 
have different welfare implications. In the dynastic framework of section 4, a rise in θ 
unambiguously  lowers the dynasty head's welfare, Vt(Ht), since any expansion of mandated 
intergenerational transfers cannot improve on the optimal transfers as determined by the dynasty 
head within the extended family. In our OLG model (with or without old age insurance), in   17
contrast, social security may in principle increase the parent's utility, Vm*, since 
intergenerational transfers are not set at their Pareto-optimal level (see Appendix A.2). 
Moreover, there is an intriguing distinction in this regard between married and single agents: 
higher social security taxes give an added advantage to singles at the expense of parents because 
of the implicit subsidy they provide to single (childless) households. In our simulations, the 
parents’ utility level, Vm*, always falls with a rise in θ while the single household’s utility level, 
Vs*, can actually rise with θ when specific parameter values are used in the simulations.
12 
II. Empirical Implementation 
  We test these propositions against international panel data via a reduced-form specification 
of our model in which the dependent variables are the model’s endogenous variables, and the basic 
regressors measure its basic parameters, including the social security tax rate, θ. Although θ is an 
exogenous variable in our model, we allow for its possible endogeneity in our regressions 
analysis. For variable construction, sources, and sample statistics, see Appendix A.8.
  
1. The Sample and Variable Construction 
  Our social security data are taken from The Cost of Social Security, published by the 
International Labour Office (ILO).  The data are available in 57 countries over 33 years, 1960-
1992, but in some countries not for all years. We measure our theoretical social security tax rate, 
θ, by the "pension" portion of social security benefits relative to GDP (PEN).  Under a balanced 
budget, expected benefits per recipient equal π2St+1 = ptπ1ntθt+1(H+H t+1) (see equation 11), while 
expected earnings per worker equals Qt+1= ptπ1nt(H+H t+1). It follows that π2St+1/Qt+1= θt+1≡PEN.  
In a balanced-budget setup, PEN consistently measures the tax rate applying to the overlapping 
generations of workers. In short-run situations, however, it is possible that PEN will be subject to 
dynamic adjustments towards its equilibrium value. In section IV.5 we allow for such possibility.    18
  We use the population’s annual marriage net of divorce rate (NETMARRY) as a proxy 
for our family formation variable (p),
13 and the official total fertility rate (TFR) as a proxy for 
average population fertility. Summers and Heston’s (1992) investment rate (I) is used to impute a 
proxy for the private savings rate using national income account identities (see section III.3).  
  To approximate our theoretical per-capita rate of investment in human capital, h, or, 
equivalently, the marginal rate of human capital formation Ah (see equation 1) we use measures of 
intermediate and the long-term per-capita GDP growth rate, since by our model, the latter converge 
on (1+g)=Ah in a steady state. To corroborate our results, we also construct a direct measure of per-
capita investment in human capital based on three variants of schooling data: average schooling 
years in the population (SCHYR), average enrollment rate in secondary schools (SEC), and 
students’ performance scores in international knowledge tests (SCORE) (see section IV.1).   
  Our basic explanatory variables include PEN, measures of the survival probabilities to 
adulthood and old age (Pi1 and Pi2), and the GDP share of government spending (G) separating 
our social security tax from overall taxation. In all regressions we also include measures of the 
economic status of women, since our model does not distinguish between male and female 
agents, but mothers’ employment opportunities may have special relevance for family choices. 
Since our sample includes a combination of developing and advanced economies, we also control 
for an economy’s development stage by including initial GDP per-capita (GDPN) or schooling level 
(SCHYR) as endogenous regressors. To test specific theoretical predictions we also separate our 
full sample into OECD and non-OECD and distinguish provident-fund and non-provident-fund 
countries. Our data sources are presented in Appendix A.8.  
2. Model Specification 
  Our basic regression specification is a linear model with country-specific fixed-effects: 
(21)  L 4 t , t y +  = α0 + α1 LPENt + α2LPi1t+ α3LPi2t + α4LGt + ut,     19
where  4 t , t y +  measures the average value of each of our four endogenous variables, including per-
capita income growth (GDPNt+4/GDPNt), over a 5-year lead period, from t to t+4; L denotes 
natural logs; and α0 is a vector of country-specific dummy variables. The other regressors (X) are 
measures of the model’s basic parameters in period t.  
  The basic idea is to treat the mean realized values of the model’s endogenous variables over 
periods of intermediate length as samples of their equilibrium values along the growth-equilibrium 
development path, and to test the effects of initial changes in our measure of θ, PEN, on these 
values (see Barro and Lee, 2003). Although in equation (21), PENt is entered as a predetermined 
variable, we also run regressions treating it as endogenous using a 2SLS procedure (see below). We 
rely on two sample specifications to estimate equation (21): In variant (21.a) the sample we use 
includes “rolling” 5-year periods, where  4 t , t y +  and the Xt are computed over consecutive beginning 
periods (t, t+1, etc). In variant (21.b)  4 t , t y +  and Xt are computed for non-overlapping 5-year periods. 
Clearly, the sample size associated with (21.b) becomes much smaller. We also examined 3 and 7 
lead-year specifications, which yielded similar qualitative results to those reported in tables 1-4. 
  As explained above, we introduce GDPNt, or SCHYRt, treated as endogenous variables, to 
account for the economy’s stage of transition to a steady state of growth, which yield very similar 
results, except that SCHYR restricts the sample size by approximately 600 observations, so GDPN 
is used in most regressions.
14 In our intermediate income-growth regressions based on equation 
(21), however (and by necessity in equation 22 below where GDPNt is a dependent variable), we 
use instead the schooling measure (SCHYR), to avoid a “regression fallacy bias” (see Friedman 
1992). The family-formation regressions include also the absolute deviation of the female 
population share from 50 percent (DSEX). Other regressors added in variants of equation (21) are 
female labor force participation rate (FLFP) and ratio of female to male schooling (FSCH). In the   20
savings regression we also introduce money supply (M2) and inflation rate (INFLA) (see section 
III.3). The country dummies in equation (21) control for missing country-specific institutional 
factors, including differences in variable counts,
15 or the initial values of physical capital. This 
fixed-effects specification captures within-country variations in our regressors (X).  
  We add a special regression specification, (24) below, as an alternative to equation (21), to 
account for the long-term growth rate of per-capita income or schooling attainments, (1+g) = Ah, 
which serve as proxies for our theoretical growth rate of human capital per capita. In a steady state: 
(22) GDPNt = (GDPN0) exp[g(Xt)t] exp(ut), and by the logic of equation (18)    
(23) g(Xt) =  β1 + β2 LPENt + β3LPi1t + β4LPi2t +  β5LGt.  
Taking the log of (22), the growth rate equation (23) can then be estimated from: 
(24) LGDPNt = β0 + β1 t+ β2 t⋅LPENt + β3 t⋅LPi1t + β4 t⋅LPi2t + β5 t⋅LGt + ut, 
where β0 is a vector of country-specific dummy variables.  The growth rate g over the entire sample 
period in these long-term growth regressions is thus the sum of the coefficients of the time trend 
(t) and the interaction terms associated with it. The interaction terms (tX), in turn, capture both 
between- and within-country variations in the explanatory variables (X), and may thus improve our 
ability to estimate the long-term effects of these variables, including PEN, on the growth rate.  In 
another version of equation (24) - (24a) - we add the interaction terms of t and our country dummies 
(tβ0) to allow for heterogeneous growth rates across countries, making (24a) analogous to (21). 
  To account for the possible endogeneity of PEN, we employ a 2SLS estimation procedure. 
Hausman’s tests reject the exogeneity of PENt in regressions explaining marriage, divorce, net 
marriage, investment rate, and income growth rate. Indeed, in countries with relatively high values 
of these variables, the PAYG system can more easily balance  high “defined benefits” set by 
politicians. Also, observed GDPNt and SCHYRt are inherently endogenous variables in our model.    21
  Instrumental variables used consistently in our first-stage regressions (apart from the 
exogenous variables entering equation 21) are: the age of the social security program since initiation 
(MATURE), its squared value (MATURESQ), the population share of age groups 0-14 (AGE) and 
65 and over (POP65), the population share of females (SEX), the economy’s inflation rate (INFLA), 
net export (NX), money supply (M2), and GDP share of public education expenditures (PUBED). 
The first five variables capture the impact of the systems’ maturity, or past and prospective buildups 
of surpluses in the social security budgets, and the impact of retiree interest groups relative to 
younger age cohorts (following the logic of Boadway and Wildasin, 1989, Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin, 1999, and Boldrin and Rustichini’s 2000 political-economy models of “demand” for PAYG 
social security) on the political willingness to raise social security taxes and benefits. INFLA, NX, 
M2 and PUBED are used to capture the long-term impacts of monetary, trade, and public 
educational policies on the macro economy.  We use PUBED also as an instrument for predicting 
PEN because, as argued by Rojas (2004), public educational subsidies may lower the cost of human 
capital investment and thus raise the quality of children at the expense of quantity. This can change 
the age structure of the population and require an increase in the social security tax rate. Basmann’s 
test indicates that these variables can indeed serve as instrumental variables in the first-stage 
regressions, and they are also found to have inconsistent and insignificant effects if added as 
regressors in the structural model. 
  As part of our sensitivity analysis, we introduce PEN in both linear and logarithmic forms.  
A Box-Cox analysis of optimal transformation generally favors using a linear transformation of 
PEN in equation (21), but a logarithmic one in the growth regressions based on both equations 
(21) and (24).  It also favors a log transformation for all other variables in both equations (21) 
and (24).  Although we report only the results from the optimal transformations, those based on 
the alternative transformations of PEN yield similar elasticity estimates.    22
  III. Empirical Findings 
1. Family Formation Regressions 
 In  Table 1, the dependent variables are the annual rates of marriage, divorce, and net 
marriage in the population age 15 and over, averaged over a 5-year lead period. The basic 
regression specification is (21), with all variables entered in logs except PEN. Models (columns) 1 
and 2 present OLS estimates of (21.a), augmented by the deviation of the female/male ratio from 
50% (DSEX.). In model 2 we add female labor force participation rate (FLFP) and female-male 
ratio of schooling years (FSCH). In model 3, we treat PEN and LGDPN as endogenous via 2SLS 
(the instrumental variables are listed in the legend). In models 4, 5 and 6, we re-estimate models 1, 2 
and 3, based on non-overlapping periods. A complete analysis of the determinants of PEN is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Our first-stage regressions indicate, however, that political support for a 
PAYG system is greater in countries with aging populations, more qualifying male workers, and 
more mature systems. That our OLS estimates of PEN effects are lower than corresponding 2SLS 
estimates is consistent with the endogeneity argument, since political pressure to raise PEN is likely 
to be greater in countries where family formation, savings, and productivity growth are higher. The 
first-stage LGDPN regressions also indicate that higher inflation rates affect LGDPN adversely.  
  The measured PEN effects are significant and consistent with our predictions: while a higher 
PEN reduces marriage, it raises divorce. Indeed, PEN has an even more pronounced effect in all 
NETMARRY regressions, despite the latter’s limitations as a measure of family formation (see fn. 
13), and distinct from the generally negative impacts of the government’s tax or spending rate, G, or 
the average income level, GDPN. This is also despite the fact that a non-working spouse may have 
an incentive to marry and stay married, at least over a prescribed number of years, especially when 
legally entitled to collect pension benefits vested with the working spouse (see section I.3).    23
  The analysis in section I.3 and our simulations suggest that higher survival probabilities, π1 
or π2 increase the benefits from family formation. Table 1 supports these predictions.
16 It also shows 
that the more imbalanced is the female-male population ratio, the lower is the marriage rate.   
Consistent with Becker’s theory of marriage, lower female labor force participation and higher 
(more similar) female, relative to male, schooling also increases net family formation.  
2. Fertility Regressions 
 In  Table 2, the dependent variable, TFR, stands for the average number of children born to 
all females aged 15-49, averaged over a 5-year lead period. Theoretically, TFR represents, therefore, 
the product of the fertility rate per parent, n, and the share of parental households in the population, 
p. Since p is approximated by the flow variable NETMARRY, however, TFR can be expected to be 
a monotonically increasing, but not necessarily proportional, function of n and NETMARRY. 
Models 1-6 are analogous to those of NETMARRY with the exception that in models 1A-3 and 5-6 
we add LNETMARRY (treated as endogenous in models 3 and 6), along with LFLFP and LFSCH. 
Hausman's test rejects the exogeneity of GDPN and NETMARRY, but not of PEN. 
  In all of Table 2’s models, PEN has a negative and significant effect on TFR.  By including 
the net marriage rate as an additional regressor, we attempt to isolate the partial effect of PEN on 
fertility within families (n) conditional on our proxy for p, which is what we analyzed theoretically. 
In model 1A the partial effect of PEN on TFR in elasticity terms is -.051, while that of 
NETMARRY is .2314. The unconditional elasticity of TFR with respect to PEN in model 1A can 
thus be imputed as -0.051+ 0.2314*(-0.379) = -0.138, where -0.379 is the estimated elasticity of 
NETMARRY with respect to PEN in Table 1. This estimate is very close to the estimated elasticity 
in model 1, -0.113. A very similar finding applies to our corresponding 2SLS estimates. Tables 1 
and 2 are thus seen to exhibit remarkably consistent results.    24
  Consistent with our analysis in section I.3, Pi1 significantly lowers fertility, while Pi2 
generally raises it. GDPN has a negative and significant effect on fertility, reflecting our 
predicted dynamic pattern of TFR over the demographic transition, and PEN’s negative effect on 
fertility is shown to be distinct from that of G. The negative effect of female labor force 
participation reflects the impact of higher labor market opportunities on the shadow price of the 
quantity of children, but it is interesting to note that higher relative educational attainments by 
females increase desired fertility. Conceivably, the more similar are the educational attainments of 
married couples, the greater is their demand for public goods within marriage, including children. 
3. Savings Regressions 
  As an empirical measure of the individual savings rate, s, we use the share of investment in 
GDP (I).  The national-income-accounts identity links this measure with the savings rate SAV (a 
proxy for s) as follows: SAV = I+DEFICIT+NX, where DEFICIT is the fraction of the government 
deficit in GDP and NX is the fraction of net exports in GDP. In models 1-6 and 1A of Table 3 we 
utilize this identity to run unrestricted regressions by entering DEFICIT and NX as additional 
regressors. The regressions are analogous to those in Table 2, except that regressors in models 2 
and 5 include, apart from FLFP and FSCH, money supply (M2) and the inflation rate (INFLA), 
as these variables can exert independent effects on yields in capital markets (from which our 
theoretical model abstracts for simplicity). The dependent variable is the natural log of I (LI), but 
regressions run with I in natural form yield similar elasticity estimates of equal statistical 
significance. In models 7 and 8 we run alternative restricted specifications of model 1 using 
overlapping and non-overlapping 5-year periods. Here the natural log of SAV (LSAV) serves as 
dependent variable, where SAV is computed as I+DEFICIT+NX. Since the data used for 
DEFICIT and NX come from different sources, the restricted regressions have lower explanatory   25
power, but the qualitative results for PEN and other regressors are consistent across comparable 
restricted and unrestricted specifications.   
  In all regressions SAV is imputed as the ratio of savings to aggregate income.  It thus 
approximates the weighted average of savings rates by married and single adults [psm + (1-p)ss] 
weighted by their respective population shares.  Theoretically, the effect of PEN on SAV 
therefore incorporates both compositional and behavioral effects.  An increase in PEN may 
reduce sm and especially ss by proposition 5. It also reduces the marriage probability, however, 
which is expected to raise the average savings rate by proposition 3. The effect of PEN on SAV 
may thus be ambiguous if it also reflects the reduction in the net marriage rate, p.  To account for 
this ambiguity, we present the regressions for SAV with and without NETMARRY as a regressor. 
In models 2A and 5A we also report the estimated effect of an interaction term of NETMARRY 
and PEN in order to allow for possible different marginal effects of the social security tax rate on 
savings by parents and single agents, as implied by proposition 5 and our calibrated simulations. 
  Table 3 shows that PEN exerts an adverse effect on the savings rate, consistent with our 
simulations in Table I. Similar qualitative findings are reported in Feldstein (1997), using US time 
series data, and Samwick (2000) using cross-section data from 94 countries averaged over 1991-94. 
  Inconsistent with proposition 3, however, the effect of NETMARRY is positive in most 
regressions. A basic reason is that our empirical savings measure includes not just savings for own 
old-age needs, which is the only objective of savings we model theoretically, but also a component 
designed to finance children’s higher education costs or bequest, which is larger for married 
households. The direction of the impact of PEN or the interaction term of PEN and NETMARRY 
should not be affected by this broader savings measure, however, as these regressors are expected to 
affect the savings for old age component of total savings. Indeed, while PEN reduces the imputed 
savings rate, the coefficient of PEN*NETMARRY is positive and significant, implying that a higher   26
PEN has a greater adverse effect on savings by singles, consistent with our calibrated simulations. 
Also consistent with our theoretical simulations, a higher Pi1 decreases the savings rate in married 
households and a higher Pi2 increase the savings rate in all households. None of the added 
regressors entering model 2 is found to have statistically significant effects on the imputed savings. 
We report these results essentially as sensitivity tests.  
4. Per Capita GDP Growth Regressions  
 In  Table 4 we report our “growth” regression results. In part A, we implement equation 
(21), where the dependent variable is the intermediate growth rate GDPNt+4/GDPNt. In part B, we 
implement equation (24), where the dependent variable is LGDPNt, the long-term growth rate 
over the 30-year sample period is measured partly by the time trend coefficient, and the impact 
of basic parameters on growth is indicated by interaction terms’ effects (T*X).
17 
  The regression models in part A are analogous to those in the earlier tables except that 
SCHYR is included instead of GDPN due to a regression fallacy bias noted by Friedman (1992): 
countries with higher than expected per-capita income at an initial period are likely to regress 
towards the means in later years, exerting a downward bias especially in the intermediate-growth 
regressions of part A. Indeed, if we add LGDPN as a regressor, this variable becomes dominant, 
rendering all other regressors insignificant. We mitigate the potential bias by using average 
schooling years to account for the development stage, which is imperative in our long-term 
growth regressions of part B, where LGDPN is also the dependent variable. Consistent with our 
main prediction, LPEN exhibits a significant adverse effect on the long-term income growth rate 
in all regressions, contrary to the reported positive effects of PEN in Zhang and Zhang (2004).
18  
  Note that in model 1 of both parts A and B, the interaction terms of the time trend and 
country dummies allow for only within-country variability in all regressors, and hence for 
heterogeneous growth rates across countries. In part B, however, the interaction terms capture   27
both within- and between- country variations. For comparability we therefore run model 1B in 
part A. Models 3 and 6 feature 2SLS estimates accounting for the endogeneity of LPEN, LSCHYR, 
and LNETMARRY, as indicated by Hausman’s test.  We should also point out that GDPN is shown 
to have a unit root in part B. We therefore conducted a panel cointegration test, based on Pedroni 
(1999), which showed that GDPN and our regressors are cointegrated. The estimated regression 
coefficients are thus statistically unbiased.   
  The introduction of LNETMARRY as an added regressor in both parts A and B has a 
special significance. Although our theoretical analysis abstracted from ascribing to family formation 
any direct effect on human capital formation, such an effect can be established through a 
straightforward extension of our model, since our theoretical “probability of marriage” is also a 
proxy for the average duration of stable marriages; the latter enhances the opportunity of married 
households to invest in children. In Model 3 of part B, we estimate the importance of family 
formation (p) by introducing NETMARRY as an additional endogenous regressor.  
  The survival probability Pi2 generally exhibits a positive effect on the GDPN growth rate 
when these effects are also statistically significant, while Pi1 has no robust effect. One reason is that 
Pi1, computed as the survival probability from age 0 to age 24, does not account effectively for the 
age at which young adults enter the labor force and contribute to production in different countries. 
In contrast, in constructing Pi2, we were able to correct for the age at which old-age “dependency” 
begins in different countries according to their social security laws (see Appendix A.8).   
  Government spending as a share of GDP, G, generally shows an adverse effect on growth, 
consistent with the findings in Ehrlich and Lui (1999).  The independent effect of PEN cannot be 
ascribed, therefore, to higher government spending or a higher general tax rate. In Table 4, female 
labor force participation is generally found to enhance the growth rate, while female relative 
schooling is found to have the opposite effect, although these effects are not consistent.    28
IV. Corroborations and Additional Sensitivity Tests 
1. Human Capital Regressions. In section III, we used measures of long-term per-capita income 
growth to test our model’s implication about the long-term human capital growth rate, Ah. In part 
(1) of Table A, we attempt to construct more direct measures of human capital formation based on 
schooling attainments proxies, using the basic regression specifications of Table 4. In Table A, we 
report only the estimated regression coefficients for our focus variable, PEN. 
  In the first three columns implementing equation (21.a), the dependent variables are the 
growth rates over a 5-year lead period of three schooling measures: average schooling years in the 
population (SCHYR), secondary school enrollment rates (SEC), and our international test scores 
measure (SCORE).  The first two are essentially quantity rather than quality measures of schooling, 
and they do not fully reflect parental inputs into children’s education. The serious limitations of 
“schooling” measures as proxies for human capital formation notwithstanding, these measures 
appear to better approximate the stock of human capital per worker, rather than investment flows, 
even in the case of SEC, which may be partly a stock measure because it is the average enrollment 
rates of 6 cohorts. In the following three columns implementing equation (24), the effect of PEN on 
the long-term growth rate is estimated via the interaction term T*LPEN, as in Table 4. 
  Consistent with our main prediction, LPEN or T*LPEN exhibit a pronounced and 
significant  adverse effect on the long-term growth rates of our human capital proxies. Taken 
together with the results of Table 4, the “human capital formation” regressions of Table A lend 
support not just to our results concerning the adverse “growth effects” of social security taxes, but 
also to our underlying theoretical analysis, whereby human capital serves as the engine of growth.   
2. PAYG v. Provident-Fund Systems. An important corroborative test of our model is the 
comparative effect of PEN in countries where social security operates as a defined-contributions 
“provident fund”, rather than a PAYG, defined-benefits system.  In provident-fund countries, PEN   29
represents essentially a compulsory retirement-savings rate rather than a tax.  It may alter voluntary 
private savings only to the extent that the former exceeds the latter. But even in this case, there will 
be little change in private savings if individuals can borrow against their provident-fund savings.  
Some provident funds even permit using individual balances to finance health, education, and 
housing needs, which allows the rate of savings to adjust to its privately desired level. We thus 
expect PEN to exert little impact on family choices in provident-fund, relative to PAYG, countries. 
  Our sample includes just three countries where social security is a government-managed 
provident fund (Fiji, Malaysia and Singapore). Applying Chow’s test for the equality of the 
regression coefficients in this subset relative to our non-provident-fund subset, we reject the 
hypothesis of equal PEN coefficients in all regressions.
19 Moreover, PEN has statistically 
insignificant effects on all our endogenous variables when we run separate regressions for the 
provident-funds countries (see part 2 of Table A), and when these countries are excluded from the 
total sample, PEN’s impact becomes slightly larger than in tables 1-4. In contrast, we find virtually 
no changes in the estimated regression coefficients when we exclude from the full sample countries 
with 0 PEN (i.e., no social security) over our sample period (Hong Kong, Korea, and Venezuela).  
3. OECD v. Non-OECD Countries. Our theoretical simulations in part B of Table I indicate that 
the negative elasticities of p, n, and s with respect to θ are higher in magnitude at an advanced, 
relative to an early, phase of development. To control for large gaps in development levels, we have 
separated our sample to OECD and non-OECD countries. Consistent with our simulations, the 
elasticities of each of the endogenous variables with respect to PEN are found to be significantly 
larger in magnitude in the OECD, relative to the non-OECD set (see part 3 of Table A).  This can 
also be partly an outcome of the fact that the tax rate levels (PEN) are higher in the OECD countries 
– our simulations in Table I indicate that the adverse effects of θ are larger in this case. Note that for 
countries at an initial transition to a growth regime, the growth of per-capita GDP, (1+g), is not an   30
efficient measure of the growth-equilibrium value of Ah. This may explain why the PEN effect on 
growth is much less pronounced in the non-OECD set.   
4. Time Trend and Autocorrelation. Since our demographic variables exhibit clear downward 
trends in most countries, in part (4) of Table A, we also report regression estimates of model 1 with 
time trend entered arbitrarily as an additional regressor. Cochran-Orcutt tests indicate the presence 
of serial correlation of the first order in the family formation and fertility regressions, but not in the 
savings and growth regressions. We thus show estimates of model 1 in part (5) of Table A after 
correcting for serial correlation in the former two regressions. However, an AR(1) correction may 
not be the appropriate one to use in these 5-year lead regressions, and for this reason we do not 
rerun Tables 1 and 2 in their entirety with this correction. The qualitative effects of PEN and other 
regressors are not affected by these tests.  
5. Other Sensitivity Tests.  Our tax measure PEN, measures the ratio of “pension” benefits to 
GDP.  Total benefits, as reported by the ILO, include also welfare payments for unemployed, 
employment injury payments, and maternity benefits, which are not expected to exert the same 
negative intergenerational externality we predict for the theoretical PAYG tax rate, θ (see fn. 10). 
Maternity benefits may actually increase the incentive to bear children. To test this implication, we 
have replaced PEN by NETBEN, defined as the ratio to GDP of total social security benefits minus 
pension benefits. The estimated effects of NETBEN are found to be weaker and less pronounced 
than those in tables 1-4 in general.  We also find that the effects of PEN on our dependent variables 
are robust when we include PEN as well as NETBEN (not reported to save space). 
  In Tables 1-4 we have treated PENt (or LPENt) as a “balanced-budget” measure of our 
theoretical tax variable, θt. To test the sensitivity of our results to possible deviations of the observed 
PENt from its fully funded value PEN*, we insert PENt and PENt-1 as regressors in a modified 
version of equation (21.1) - equation (21.1a) - representing a dynamic partial adjustment process:    31
(25) PENt  −PENt-1 = ϖ(θt  −PENt-1), which implies that θt  = PEN*= ηPENt+(1−η)PENt-1, with 
η=(1/ϖ)>0. Note that while the coefficients η and α1 cannot be identified separately if we use either 
OLS or a non-linear maximum likelihood estimation method to estimate equation (21.1a), the sum 
of the estimated coefficients of PENt and PENt-1 adds up by equation (25) to the behavioral effect of 
θt we seek to estimate (α1). In all cases, this effect is found to be negative and statistically 
significant, and its magnitude is found to be close to the estimated effect of PEN in tables 1-4.
20 
V. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
  By formulating a comprehensive model of family formation and family choices, we are 
able to derive a set of discriminating implications concerning social security’s impact on 
demographic variables and the real economy. This enables us to reexamine and partly reconcile 
some conflicting theoretical inferences and empirical findings in previous studies. Despite the 
limitations of our data, taken together our empirical results in Tables 1-4 are consistent with 
corresponding simulations of both the OLG and dynastic versions of our model.
21 They are also 
corroborated by Table A and related tests.  
  Our regression results suggest the existence of non-trivial effects of PEN on key 
demographic and economic variables in countries subject to PAYG, defined-benefits systems. 
Table B projects the quantitative importance of such effects using two scenarios: (a) a single 
percentage point reduction in PEN; (b) a reduction in the mean level of PEN over 1960-1991 to 
its level in 1960. The projections are illustrated for the “world” set, based on the non-provident-
fund sample regressions, and for the U.S., based on our OECD-set regressions in table A.  
  For the U.S., for example, we project that had the average PEN remained constant at its 
1960 level of .0459, instead of the average level of .0666 over the sample period, the net marriage 
rate would have increased by 12.7%, and the total fertility rate would have increased by 6.5% over 
the sample period.
22 Also, the average savings rate would have risen by 2.1%, and the mean annual   32
growth rate of per-capita GDP would have increased from 1.81% to 1.96%, implying that per-
capita GDP would have been higher by 3.1 percent in 1991. Comparable projections apply to the 
“world” set if its average PEN remained at its 1960 level of .0322 instead of .056.  
  Our projections are consistent with Feldstein’s (1997) assessment that elimination of social 
security taxes in the U.S. would raise the private savings level by 60%.  Based on the regression 
models for savings and income-growth using the OECD data in Table A (with PEN entered as a 
linear regressor in both models) we project that if PEN were reduced to 0 from its mean level of 
0.0666 over 1960-1991, the private U.S. savings level would have risen by 46% in 1991. 
  The projections in Table B also indicate the potential benefits from a partial shift from the 
current PAYG system to a mandated savings system of personal retirement accounts (PRA), based 
on defined contributions.  Our projected effects of a percentage point tax reduction may apply to 
such a shift, provided that the mandated savings do not exceed the optimal savings rate desired 
by individuals, or that individuals could efficiently borrow against their PRA balances.  The 
effect of a partial shift to PRA can be even more pronounced in Europe than in the US, where 
average PEN is higher (0.087 in Europe vs. 0.067 in the US over our sample period). Such shifts 
could improve not just the economy, but also the financial viability of social security itself.   
Quite apart from these policy implications, our analysis suggests that the expanded scale 
of the PAYG system over the last century has contributed to the diminished importance of 
intergenerational transfers going from children to old parents – the traditional family security 
system. Our analysis also suggests that changes in social security taxes can result in relatively 
larger welfare effects for married relative to single agents. Needless to say, our work is not 
exhaustive. For example, we have not fleshed out our model’s implications on trends in labor 
force participation and life expectancy, and we have addressed only partially welfare gains and 
losses from the PAYG system. We leave the study of these issues for future work. Appendix 
 
A.1   A simple, but sufficiently general way to allow for uncertainty of children’s survival in the 
benchmark model, or in the extended model of section I.3, is to assume that benefits to parents 
are subject to two ‘states of the world’: either no children survive, so parents lose all old-age 
benefits from their investments in children (a default state), or at least one child survives and 
assumes the obligations of all siblings towards their parents (a non-default state).  The prospect 
of old-age consumption for parents becomes {D(H+ H t )
1−κ[(H+ H t )smt]
κ + St+1} with probability 
(1−π1)
n , and {[π1ntwt+1Ht+1] /[1− (1−π1)
n] + D(H+ H t )
1−κ[(H+ H t )smt]
κ + St+1} with probability 
1−(1−π1)




α}. The basic change in behavioral implications is that parental 
investment in children, h, is no longer independent of θ. Thus all control variables: n, h, and sm 
may now fall if θ rises. Indeed, our simulations of this case, which we do not report to save 
space, are consistent with the calibrated simulations of the deterministic case in Table I.  
 
A.2   Optimal investments in children and savings in equations (13′), (14′) and (18) are conditional 
on the compensation parents expect to receive from each child, wt+1, assuming that implicit family 
contracts are fully honored (see fn 9). We follow EL (1991) in analyzing the choice of wt+1 as a 
principal-agent problem, since parents and (unborn) children cannot negotiate a Pareto-optimal 
bargaining solution for n. Accordingly, parents (acting as agents) select values of wt+1 that maximize 
equation (2) for children. The resulting Stackelberg-equilibrium solution is inferred from:  
(19) dW(t+1)/dwt+1 = [∂W(t+1)/∂Ht+1] [∂Ht+1/∂wt+1] + ∂W(t+1) /∂wt+1 = 0. 
The optimal compensation rate, w
*, which we simulate in Table I after expanding equation (19), 
equates the marginal cost and benefit to grown-up children from rewarding their parents for the 
earning capacity they helped create, subject to the “reaction function” {h, w} governing the 
parents’ investment decision (∂ht/∂wt+1).  
 
A.3   We calibrate the model’s basic parameters using actual U.S. data and some consensus 
estimates in the literature. Each of the model’s “periods” is assumed to last 25 years. Survival 
probabilities of the U.S. population from ages zero to 25 and from 50 to 75 are then calculated 
from various issues of the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, and set to be 0.9663 and  
0.5823, respectively. The average US social security tax rate over our sample period is 6.66%.  
Consistent with many studies, we set the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution to be 2, so 
σ=0.5, and the time preference parameter to be 1.5%, so δ = (1/1.015)
25. Allowing for general 
theoretical restrictions, we set the altruism function parameters β and B as 1.1 and 1, and the 
savings and marriage search production parameters as κ = 0.65 and ε = 5.  The remaining 
parameters, A, v, D and L, are solved from the growth equilibrium steady state conditions of our 
extended model, using U.S. data on average per capita GDP growth rate (1.81%), average 
national savings rate (18.72%), average total fertility rate (2.166), and average share of 
households with married couples (64.90%) over our sample period (for sources see Appendix 
A.8, and the US Current Population Survey for the average share of married households). The 
average national savings and fertility rates are proxies for [psm+(1-p)ss] and np, respectively.  
 
A.4   Suppose smt ≥ sst.  Then Cm1 < Cs1 if parents also invest in children.  From (18) and (20) we 
know that Rss ≥ Rms in this case, and thus (Cs2/Cs1) ≥ (Cm2/Cm1) as well, which also implies that 
Cm2 ≤ Cs2.  But if parents save more than single adults, they also benefit directly from children at 
old age, and thus Cm2 > Cs2, which is a contradiction.  
 
A.5   To facilitate an analytical proof we take the compensation rate w to be a given constant. 
Totally differentiating ∆(t) in equation (12) with respect to θ and dividing it by (H+Ht)
1−σ, we 






−σ) Ah [1 − Enθ − Ehθ],  
where cm1 = 1− vn− hn− sm− π2w− θ, cm2 = [π1nw+ p(π1/π2)]Ah + Dsm
κ, cs1 = 1− ss− π2w− θ, cs2 
= p(π1/π2)nθAh + Dss
κ, Enθ = −dln(n)/dln(θ), and Ehθ = −dln(h)/dln(θ). Since cm2 > cs2 by the logic 
of proposition 3 and ∆p ≡ ∆p(t)/(H+Ht)
1−σ is negative by the second order optimality condition, 
dp/dθ = −∆θ/∆p <0 provided that cs1 ≥ c m1 (which is always the case if spending on raising 
children is sufficiently large) and the sum of the elasticities of h* and n* with respect to θ, Enθ + 
Ehθ, is less than one.  Our simulation analysis indicates that the sum of these elasticities is indeed 
less than unity for a wide range of variations in the model’s underlying parameters.  
 
A.6   If the absolute elasticity of family formation, p, with respect to the social security tax rate is 
lower than one, the increase in the tax rate will raise the social security benefits per adult, and  
hence the consumption ratio, (C2/C1), for both a married adult and a single adult.  Appendix B in 
EL (1998) proves for the case where β>1, which is uniformly assumed in this paper to ensure 
interior solutions in both n and h over the entire dynamic equilibrium path, that the higher θ 
lowers at least one of the parent’s three choice variables satisfying equations (13′), (14′) and 
(18). For a single adult, the increase in θ will necessarily lower the saving rate by equation (20).   
 
A.7   If the dynasty head in period t also controls the pooled incomes of the overlapping 
generations of earners in period t+1, the consumption allocation decisions are first determined to 




1−σ−1], subject to the budget constraint: 
π2C2(t+1) + π1ntC1(t+1) = π2St+1 + π2DHtst
κ + π1nt(1−vnt+1−ht+1nt+1−st+1−θ)Ht+1. The first-order 
optimality conditions provide the optimal consumption allocation rule as follows:  
[C1(t+1)/C2(t+1)]
σ = (π1nt)
β(1-σ)-1 π2.  
Plugging this optimal solution for each period beyond period t into the expected utility of the 
dynasty head in period t, the relevant value function in period t becomes:  
Vt(Ht) =  max [1/(1–σ)][C1(t)
1−σ–1]  
           + δπ2{[1/(1−σ)][C2(t+1)
1−σ−1] + (π1nt)
β(1−σ) [1/(1−σ)][C1(t+1)
1−σ−1]} + ..., 
           = max [1/(1–σ)][C1(t)
1−σ–1] + δπ2 Ωa(nt)Vt+1(Ht+1), 
where  Ω(nt)  ≡ [(π1nt)
[1−β(1−σ)](1−σ)/σ  π2
(σ−1)/σ + (π1nt)
β(1−σ)]. The optimality conditions for interior 
values of the control variables st, nt, and ht, used in our simulations in part (iii) of Table II are: 
0 = −C1(t)
−σ π1nt-1 Ht/Φ(nt-1) + δπ2
2 Ω(nt) C1(t+1)
−σ DHtκst
κ−1 /Φ(nt),  
0 = −C1(t)
−σ π1nt-1(v+ht)Ht/Φ(nt-1) + δπ2[∂Ω(nt)/∂nt]Vt+1(Ht+1), 
0 = −C1(t)
−σ π1nt-1 nt/[A Φ(nt-1)] + δπ2 Ω(nt) Vt+1′(Ht+1),  




(σ−1)/σ + (π1nt)], and Vt+1′(Ht+1)=(1−σ)Vt+1/Ht+1,.  The direction of 
intergenerational transfers can be determined, in principle, by comparing the consumption flows 
for each of the overlapping generations relative to their assigned share of the family income.  
  
A.8   Variables used, sources, and mean values over the sample period 1960-1992.  
Variable Description  Mean 
[Std. Dev.] 
PEN (“Pension”)  Old-age, survivor, and disability-insurance portion of social security benefits as 
a share of GDP (ILO)  
0.056 [.040] 
NETMARRY  Current marriage net of divorce rate (UN)  8.35 [2.82] 
MARRY  Marriage rate: the annual number of marriages per 1000 population age 15 and 
over (UN) 
10.06 [2.53] 
DIVORCE  Divorce rate: the annual number of divorces per 1000 population age 15 and 
over  (UN) 
1.69 [1.19] 
TFR  Total fertility rate: number of children born to an average woman over her 
reproductive years (UN) 
2.81 [1.28] 
I  GDP shares of capital investment (Summers-Heston)  23.71 [7.47] 
DEFICIT  Share of the government deficit in GDP (IMF)  2.94 [4.25] 
NX  current account surplus (IMF)  -5.54 [117.0] 
SCHYR  Average schooling years in the population 25 years and over (Barro-Lee)  6.22 [2.46] 
SEC  Students enrolled in secondary schools as a share of official secondary school-
age children (UNESCO) 
0.60 [0.23] 
SCORE  Students’ performance scores in international knowledge tests
1 (ETS)  268.5 [51.6] 
GDPN  Real per-capita income (Summers-Heston) 6753  [3911] 
G  GDP shares of government spending (Summers-Heston)  14.69 [5.98] 
Pi1  Survival probability of the population from ages zero to twenty four (UN)  0.95 [0.04] 
Pi2  Survival probability from the official qualifying age for pension benefits 
through the following fifteen years
2 (UN) 
0.64 [0.12] 
DSEX  Deviation of females’ population share from 50 percent in absolute value (WB)  0.93 [1.50] 
FLFP  Female labor force participation rate (WB)  38.34 [12.9] 
FSCH  Ratio of average schooling years for females to that for males (Barro-Lee) 0.85  [0.16] 
M2  Aggregate money supply (WB)  0.69 [11.71] 
MATURE  Number of years elapsing from the year when the pension benefits program 
started (SSA) 
39.34 [24.1] 
POP65  Population share of the age group 65 and up (UN)  0.09 [3.97] 
AGE  Population share of the age group 0-14 (UN)  0.29 [0.09] 
SEX  Population share of the female (UN)  0.51 [0.02] 
INFLA  Annual inflation rate (Summers-Heston)  5.03 [3.01] 
PUBED  Share of public education expenditures in GDP (UNESCO)  4.60 [1.57] 
 
1. The Educational Testing Service (ETS) of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) 
has conducted cross-country evaluations of educational achievement in science over the past four decades.  These tests reveal the 
relative achievements of students in different countries in a given year, but they are not comparable over time, since they are not 
adjusted for changes in the tests’ degree of difficulty.  To make such adjustments, we calibrate the international test scores using 
data about the achievements of US students in standardized science tests from 1970 on, as reported by the National Assessment 
of Educational Progress (NAEP) of the U.S. Department of Education. Specifically, the ETS scores in a given year are multiplied 
by the ratio of the U.S. NAEP score to the U.S. relative international test score in the same year, to account for a common cohort 
effect in all countries. The U.S. can serve as an anchor because it has participated in all the international tests. 
2. Typically, the official qualifying age for pension benefits is 55 or 60 in developing countries, and 60 or 65 in developed 
countries.  
3. Data sources: 
(ILO) International Labor Office, The Cost of Social Security, and Year Book of Labour Statistics, Geneva, various issues. 
(UN) United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, various issues. 
(WB) World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998. 
(IMF) International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
(Barro-Lee) "International Comparisons of Educational Attainment," Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, 1993. 
(UNESCO) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
(ETS) Educational Testing Service, A World of Differences, 1989. 
(SSA) Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1995, 97, 99.  
REFERENCES 
 
Baker, Michael, Hanna, Emily and Kantarevic, Jasmin, “The Married Widow: Marriage 
Penalties Matter!” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 2004, 634-664. 
 
Barro, Robert J. and Lee, Jongwha, “IMF Programs: Who Is Chosen and What Are the Effects?” 
mimeo, 2003. 
 
Becker, Gary S. and Barro, Robert J., A reformulation of the Economic Theory of fertility”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 1988, 1-25. 
 
Becker, G.S., Murphy, K.M. and Tamura, R, “Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth”, 
Journal of Political Economy 98, 1990, S12-38. 
 
Becker, Gary S., “Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 101, 1993: 385-409. 
 
Boadway, Robin W. and Wildasin, David E., “A Median Voter Model of Social Security,” 
International Economic Review, 30, 1989. 
 
Boldrin, Michele, De Nardi, Mariacristina and Jones, Larry E., “Fertility and Social Security,” 
Working Paper, University of Minnesota, 2004. 
 
Boldrin, Michele, and Rustichini, Aldo, “Political Equilibria with Social Security,” Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 3, 2000. 
 
Cigno, Alessandro and Rosati, Furio Camillo, “Jointly determined saving and fertility behaviour: 
Theory and estimates for Germany, Italy, UK, and USA,” European Economic Review, 40, 1996, 
p. 1561-1589.  
 
Dickert-Conlin, Stacy and Meghea, Cristian, “The Effect of Social Security on Divorce and 
Remarriage Behavior,” Center for Retirement Research Working Paper #2004-09, Boston 
College, 2004. 
 
Docquier, Frederic and Paddison, Oliver, “Social Security Benefit Rules, Growth and 
Inequality,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 25 (1), 2003, p 47-71.  
 
Ehrlich, Isaac and Lui, Francis T., “Intergenerational Trade, Longevity, and Economic Growth”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 99, 1991: 1029-1059. 
 
Ehrlich, Isaac and Lui, Francis T., “Social Security, the Family, and Economic Growth”, Economic 
Inquiry, 1998.   
 
Ehrlich, Isaac and Lui, Francis T., “Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 107, 1999. 
  
Ehrlich, Isaac and Zhong, Jian-Guo, “Social Security and the Real Economy: An Inquiry into 
Some Neglected Issues,” American Economic Review, 88 (2), 1998. 
 
Feldstein, Martin., “Social Security and Saving: New Time Series Evidence”, National Tax Journal, 
49 (2), 1997. 
 
Friedman, Milton, “Do Old Fallacies Ever Die?” Journal of Economic Literature, 30, 1992. 
 
Fuster, Luisa, Imrohoroglu, Ayse and Imrohoroglu, Selahattin, “A Welfare Analysis of Social 
Security in a Dynastic Framework,” International Economic Review, 44 (4), 2003. 
 
Mulligan, Casey B. and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X., “Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security”, 
NBER Working Paper no. 7117, May 1999. 
 
Pedroni, Peter, “Critical values For Cointegration Tests In Heterogeneous Panels With Multiple 
Regressors,” Oxford Bulletin Of Economics And Statistics, 1999. 
 
Rojas, Juan A., “On the Interaction between Education and Social Security,” Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 7, 2004, 932-957. 
 
Rosati, Furio Camillo, “Social Security in a Non-Altruistic Model with Uncertainty and 
Endogenous Fertility,” Journal of Public Economics, 60 (2), 1996, p. 283-94.  
 
Samwick, Andrew A., “Is Pension Reform Conducive To Higher Saving?” Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 82 (2), 2000, 264-272. 
 
Seater, John J., “Ricardian Equivalence,” Journal of Economic Literature, 31 (1), 1993, 142-190. 
 
Summers, R. and Heston, A., “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An expanded Set of 
International Comparisons, 1950-1988”, Quarterly Journal Of Economics, 106, May 1991, 
updated through 1992. 
 
Wigger, Berthold U., “Pay-as-You-Go Financed Public Pensions in a Model of Endogenous 
Growth and Fertility,” Journal of Population Economics, 12 (4), 1999, p. 625-40. 
 
Zhang, Jie and Zhang, Junsen, “How does social security affect economic growth? Evidence 






1 For example, Rosati (1996) concludes that social security affects fertility adversely but raises savings, using a 
static model where fertility and savings are the only alternatives. Wigger (1999) reaches a similar conclusion in an 
endogenous-growth model where only fertility and growth are considered as alternatives. Docquier and Paddison 
(2003) show adverse effects on both saving and growth, but treat fertility as exogenous. EL (1998) and Ehrlich and 
Zhong (1998) examine growth effects along with fertility and savings and conclude that all may be adversely 
affected. Zhang and Zhang (2004), who also consider all three choice variables, conclude that adverse effects apply 
only to fertility, but they base their analysis on a non-standard utility function whereby parental utility is strongly 
separable in the quantity and quality of children, which produces a strong degree of substitutability between the two, 
and positive growth effects. Their specification is inconsistent, however, with that of BB (1988), Becker et al. 
(1990) and EL (1998) where utility from children is a multiplicative function of their number.  For recent reviews of 
the longer-held debate on social security’s effect on savings see Seater (1993), and Feldstein (1997). 
 
2 For example, if parents are motivated just by old-age transfers from children, as in the benchmark case of EL 
(1998), social security affects just investment in human capital. In Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2004), a similar 
motive produces just fertility effects; however they do not consider human capital investments. Cigno and Rosati 
(1996) consider a static model with forward or backward altruism to investigate the social security effect on fertility 
and savings. If altruism is the only motive for parents, and no private alternatives to social security exist, we show 
that only fertility and family formation, but not human capital formation, are adversely affected (see proposition 1). 
   
3 To our knowledge, there has not been any study addressing the effect of social security on family formation, 
although a couple of papers have examined the effects of eliminating implicit marriage penalties in social security 
provisions. Baker, Hanna and Kantarevic (2004) study the effect of Canadian system reform in 1987, which allowed 
surviving spouses of deceased workers to keep their survivor benefits upon remarriage. They show that this has 
substantially raised the remarriage rate. Dickert-Conlin and Meghea (2004) study the effect of a reform in the US 
system in 1977, which shortened the minimum marriage duration for divorcees entitling them to claim auxiliary 
benefits based on their ex-spouse’s record from 20 years to just 10 years. They find that the divorce rate at the ninth 
year of marriage decreased following the reform. Both results are consistent with our model’s basic predictions. 
 
4 The basic dynamic effects of social security on demographic trends and economic growth developed in this paper 
can be shown to hold even if supply were elastic. See also EL (1998, Appendix C).  
 
5 Institutional, legal, and religious constraints also determine the cost of “search” for a durable marriage. 
Empirically, we account for these via fixed-effects regression models. 
 
6 The equilibrium value of p is also an index of family stability, and as such it may serve as an efficiency parameter 
affecting the transmission of knowledge from parents to kids, or A= A(p) with A′(p)>0 in equation (1). Since our 
basic results hold independently of this effect, we eschew a formal specification of A(p) in (12). 
 
7 Interior equilibrium solutions require that B>0, 1=α<β<[1/(1-σ)], and w>0. These restrictions apply in the 
extended model of section I.3 as well. In the benchmark model, β needs to be further restricted: In a growth 
equilibrium, where Ah>1, β<α+αvA, whereas under the stable stagnant equilibrium, where h*=0, β>αvA. 
 
8 We specify the efficient compensation rate w as a fraction of the offspring’s return on human capital, rather than 
earnings, since this way both children and parents always share the costs and benefits from human capital 
accumulation. While for simplicity we take here all intergenerational transfers to be monetary costs and ignore 
leisure, our basic propositions would not be affected if all transfers involved time costs (see EL 1998 appendix C). 
 
9 A key condition for compliance with implicit intergenerational contracts is that young parents expect their own 
children to treat them the same way they treat their old parents. Compliance may also hold for childless single adults 
because of effective parental mentoring or sanctions imposed by siblings. And since all siblings are members of the 
extended family’s insurance pool, the compliance conditions spelled out in EL (1991) would apply to singles as well 
if they are at least minor participants in the intergenerational transfers taking place within married siblings’ families.   
 
10 This “intergenerational tax effect” does not apply necessarily to payroll taxes, as these do not necessarily alter the 
  
 
inter-temporal rate of substitution in consumption relative to the rates of return from children or savings.  
 
11 The 1999 “MetLife Juggling Act Study”, conducted by the National Center for Women and Aging at Brandeis 
University, shows that 25 percent of all U.S. households provide care for an elderly person and that care-giving costs 
individuals upwards of $659,000 over their lifetimes in lost wages, social security benefits, and pension contributions. 
 
12 For a review of related welfare effects of social security, see Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2003), who 
examine these effects in a model of heterogeneous agent with different lifespan uncertainty and exogenous fertility. 
 
13 The theoretically relevant measure of p is the share of parental households among all households, for which no 
accurate data exist. A proxy for it would be the share of legally married households in the population. However, this 
variable, if available, is typically reported in population censuses conducted every 5 or 10 years. Changes in the 
“flow” variable, NETMARRY, can still capture the change in the “stock” variable, pt in a steady state, albeit 
imperfectly, because marriage and divorce occur at different points over the life-cycle.  
 
14 Current GDPN includes both transitory and cyclical deviations from its equilibrium value along the dynamic 
growth path.  If such deviations were a function of current GDPN, this would also justify the latter’s inclusion as a 
regressor. We have also experimented with regression methods controlling for cyclical changes in GDPN over the 
sample periods, but these did not affect our results. 
 
15 For example, the marriage or divorce rate statistics depend on the way cohabitation is counted. 
 
16 It is arguable that population longevity is also an endogenous variable affecting, as well as being affected by, 
PEN. However, Hausman’s tests reject the endogeneity of Pi1 and Pi2 in all the regressions reported in Tables 1-4.  
 
17 While in this set of regressions, Box-Cox tests imply that LPEN, thus T*LPEN should be entered in logarithmic, 
rather than natural terms, a linear transformation of PEN yielded similar results. In some countries, the reported 
"pension" benefits are zero over the entire sample period or over some parts of it (Columbia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Hong Kong, Honduras, Jordan, Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Venezuela).  In the log transformations of PEN here and in 
Table A, we replace 0 by 0.00001, a value substantially below the smallest value of PEN in our full sample.  
 
18 Zhang and Zhang (2004), using our definition of the social security tax rate, PEN (they quote both EZ (1998) and 
an earlier version of this paper), report a positive effect of PEN on intermediate income growth rates. The reason is 
that they use initial GDP as a regressor. As our experiment above indicates, we can obtain similar results when 
using initial LGDPN as a regressor in the 5-year-lead growth regressions, because of a regression fallacy bias.  
 
19  For our four endogenous variables, we used our original set of regressors plus their interaction terms with a 
dummy variable distinguishing the provident-fund countries.  F-tests were performed on the OLS regression results. 
 
20 We have also tried an alternative specification of the adjustment process whereby θt = η1PENt + η2PENt-1 + 
(1−η1−η2)PENt-2, which again produced similar estimates of the effect of PEN* relative to the estimated effects of 
PEN in tables 1-4. Running this specification or equation (21.1a) via 2SLS resulted in the same inferences. 
 
21 Curiously, our theoretical model’s simulations in part A of Table I, calibrated on US data, show projected effects 
of a 1 percentage point social security tax reduction that are of the same order of magnitude as the empirical 
estimates reported in Table B. These two sets of estimates are not quite comparable, however, because the estimated 
coefficients used in Table B are derived from regressions relating to OECD states, rather than strictly to the US, and 
the simulated projection in Table I is also conditional on a few free parameter values.  
 
22 The projected change in LTFR in the US is computed as –2.9549*(0.0459-0.0666) = .0493, where –2.9549 is the 
PEN coefficient in Table A for the OECD set. We then calculate the projected level of TFR as 2.17*exp(.0493) = 
2.31, where 2.17 is the sample mean of TFR in the U.S. The projections for all other variables are similarly 
calculated. The projections are higher for the OECD countries: Using the OECD regression results in Table A, we 
project that if average PEN remained at its 1960 level of .044 instead of .076 over the sample period, NETMARRY, 
TFR, and average savings would have increased by 20.3%, 9.9%, and 4.1% from their mean levels, and that per 
capita GDP level in 1991 would have been 11.8 percent higher than its actual mean level of 6067.5. 
 Table I. Comparative Dynamics in the Extended Model: 
Impact of Changes in the Social Security Tax Rate (θ) 
A. Growth Steady State       
  p n  p⋅n  h Annual 
Growth 
sm s s Average 
saving 
w*  (Vm−Vs)** 
           
θ = 0.0666  0.6490
#  3.3374  2.1660
#  0.1461  1.810
# (%)  0.1057 0.3378 0.1872
#  0.2442 1.1812 
  [-0.0133] [-0.0453] [-0.0586] [-0.0378]    [-0.0233] [-0.0834] [-0.0492] [-0.1175]   
θ = 0.0566  0.6504 3.3620 2.1867 0.1470  1.833  0.1061 0.3424 0.1887 0.2489 1.1926 
            
θ = 0.0466  0.6518 3.3864 2.2073 0.1480  1.857  0.1066 0.3471 0.1903 0.2536 1.2039 
  [-0.0089] [-0.0296] [-0.0385] [-0.0168]    [-0.0156] [-0.0572] [-0.0370] [-0.0749]   
θ = 0.0366  0.6532 3.4106 2.2278 0.1486  1.880  0.1070 0.3519 0.1920 0.2582 1.2153 
           
B. Early and Advanced Phases of Growth
 † 
 p n h sm s s 
  T = 1  T → ∞  T = 1  T → ∞  T = 1  T → ∞  T = 1  T → ∞  T = 1  T → ∞ 
 
θ = 0.0666  0.6552 0.6278 5.3289 3.4501  0.08928  0.14331  0.10478  0.09667  0.3401 0.3348 
θ = 0.0566  0.6566 0.6292 5.3576 3.4761  0.09001  0.14411  0.10527  0.10067  0.3448 0.3395 
            
Note: Parameter values used are: σ = 0.5, δ = (1/1.015)
25, π1 = 0.9663, π2 =0.5823, v =0.0114, A=10.717, B = 1, β = 1.1, k = 0.65, D = 8.1849, H =1. The steady-state growth 
equilibria are independent of H . The marriage search function is specified as λ(p) = Lp
ε, with, L = 1.2334, ε = 5. Average savings rate is p⋅sm + (1-p)ss.  The numbers in brackets 
denote the elasticity of each endogenous variable with respect to θ. 
* The expected compensation to an old parent by each child, π2w, is 58.23% of w if π2 = 0.5823  
** The values for Vm and Vs are normalized by dividing equations (4) and (8) by (H + Ht ). The welfare gain from marriage is indicated by (Vm - Vs).  
# These are the actual average values of the endogenous variables for the U.S. during 1960-90. 
† To facilitate the simulations in part B, w is taken to be constant at the values reported in part A above: 0.2442 when θ = 0.0666, and 0.2489 when θ = 0.0566. Table II. Comparative Dynamics in Dynastic Models:  
Impact of Changes in the Social Security Tax Rate (θ) 
 
Case n  h  s  V 
(i)  w = 0      
               θ = 0.0666  3.2180 0.1908 0.0797 9.5652 
               θ = 0.0566  3.2704 0.1908 0.0816 9.7543 
(ii)  w  (exog) = 0.01      
               θ = 0.0666  3.1921 0.1919 0.0773 9.5537 
               θ = 0.0566  3.2443 0.1920 0.0790 9.7425 
(iii)
†  Income pooling      
               θ = 0.0666  2.8723 0.04571 0.8342  0.3330 
               θ = 0.0566  2.8697 0.04572 0.8443  0.3336 
Note: These dynastic models abstract from the family formation decision and take all agents to be “married”. In model (i) and (ii), w is assumed to be exogenous. Parameter values 
used are: σ = 0.7, δ = (1/1.015)
25, π1 = 0.9663, π2 =0.5823, v =0.0114, A=8, β = 1.06, k = 0.65, D = 8.1849. 
† In case (iii), we set A=30, v =0.001, k = 0.95, D = 5. Table 1.  Family Formation Regressions: Net Marriage, Marriage, and Divorce 
Fixed Effects Model 
 LNETMARRY  LMARRY  LDIVORCE 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 5  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 5 
  OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 






    Non-
overlap 
    Non-
overlap 
                
PEN  -6.7686 -6.5193  -15.8717  -8.0439 -8.5330  -10.3618  -4.5399 -4.5002  -10.2068  -5.9332 5.5392  4.0250  7.4741  3.5647 
  -17.46 -15.84 -13.32  -8.11  -7.27  -3.18  -17.72 -15.91 -13.95  -8.13 9.03 7.09 4.94 2.40 
  [-0.379] [-0.365] [-0.889] [-0.451] [-0.478] [-0.580] [-0.254] [-0.252] [-0.572] [-0.332] [0.310] [0.225] [0.419] [0.200] 
LPi1  2.6131 3.4845 2.1396 1.0702 2.1687 -0.0559 0.7660 0.8010 0.2976 0.6746 3.0551 -0.3529  -2.2062 2.4271 
  5.02 6.07 2.71 1.01 1.56 -0.03 3.00 2.98 0.88 1.24 3.71 -0.45  -2.20 1.38 
LPi2  0.2533 0.2280 0.1743 0.3523 0.2980 0.2116 0.1812 0.1696 0.1180 0.2537 -0.0685 0.0361 0.1382 0.0136 
  5.39 4.64 2.85 2.74 2.00 1.19 5.78 5.04 3.04 2.86 -0.92 0.53 1.78 0.07 
LG  -0.1233 -0.1038 -0.1117 -0.0089 -0.0510 -0.2882 0.0231 -0.0003 0.0896 -0.0245 0.7309  0.4589  0.6437  0.3425 
  -2.40 -1.75 -1.45 -0.07 -0.33 -1.42 0.66 -0.01 1.83 -0.26 9.00 5.60 6.57 1.78 
LGDPN  -0.3671 -0.4011 0.0079 -0.1899 -0.2858 -0.2339 -0.0342 -0.0598 0.1912 -0.0249 0.7095  0.6735  0.9413  0.4952 
  -9.63 -9.05 0.09 -2.24 -2.54 -1.01 -1.61 -2.41 3.97 -0.46 11.76 11.02 8.61  3.49 
LDSEX  -0.0246 -0.0062 -0.0110 -0.0186 0.0082 -0.0353 -0.0098 -0.0073 -0.0017 0.0092 -0.0042 -0.0537 -0.0037 -0.0740 
  -3.13 -0.72 -1.06 -0.95 0.29 -1.15 -1.83 -1.21 -0.26 0.53 -0.33 -4.53 -0.28 -2.05 
LFLFP  -0.2703    -0.0595    -0.0663  0.1010  1.1587  1.1795 
   -4.79    -0.42    -1.71  1.18  14.88  6.66 
LFSCH   0.3730    0.1505    0.4004  0.3720  0.3003  0.2076 
   2.55    0.45    5.63  2.72  1.49  0.49 
                
Adj. R
2  0.6383 0.6778    0.6591 0.6739    0.4649 0.4939    0.5491 0.6291 0.7604    0.7877 
N  751 638 663 168 144 111 871 754 642 172 751 638 532 144 
Notes: All regressions employ a fixed-effects regression model, but the results for country-dummies are suppressed. Rows show the estimated β and β/Sβ for each variable. The 
square-bracketed numbers for PEN convert the estimated coefficients into elasticity terms. In all regressions the dependent variables are averaged over a 5-year lead period. The 
2SLS regressions account for the endogeneity of both PEN and LGDPN since Hausman's test rejects their exogeneity. Instrumental variables include, in addition to exogenous 
structural regressors, LAGE, MATURE, MATURESQ, LPOP65, LINFLA, NX, LM2, and LPUBED. Model 4, 5, and 6 repeat the specification of model 1, 2 and 3 using non-
overlapping 5-year periods. Table 2.  Total Fertility Rate Regressions 
D e p e n d e n t   V a r i a b l e :   L T F R                                F i x e d   E f f e c t s   M o d e l s  
  Model 1  Model 1A  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 4A  Model 5  Model 6 
  OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
       Non-overlap  Non-overlap Non-overlap Non-overlap 
          
PEN -2.0145  -0.9088 -0.9822 -1.0791 -2.1421 -0.1974 0.1730 -0.3381 
 -7.23  -2.92 -3.21 -3.73 -2.93 -0.21 0.18 -1.36 
  [-0.113] [-0.051] [-0.055] [-0.060] [-0.120] [-0.011] [0.010] [-0.019] 
LPi1 -2.5384  -1.7980 -1.6433 -1.8005 -1.8617 -2.0497 -1.7652 -1.3164 
 -7.14  -4.38 -4.12 -4.06 -2.41 -2.29 -1.91 -1.20 
LPi2 0.1113  0.0440 0.0588 0.0499 0.0503 -0.0772  -0.0928  -0.0958 
 3.47  1.39  1.91  1.51  0.58 -0.82 -0.96 -0.83 
LG -0.2010  -0.1822 -0.1233 -0.2051 -0.2053 -0.1990 -0.1621 -0.2462 
 -5.00  -4.83 -2.97 -4.22 -2.31 -2.34 -1.52 -1.65 
LGDPN -0.4218  -0.3111 -0.2981 -0.3613 -0.4346 -0.2974 -0.2855 -0.4157 
 -16.70  -10.35  -9.23 -8.57 -7.08 -3.88 -3.21 -3.59 
LNETMARRY    0.2314 0.1681 0.2798    0.2773 0.2195 0.2752 
    10.68  7.79 8.81    4.29 3.32 3.29 
LFLFP     -0.2883      -0.3425  
     -7.46      -3.65  
LFSCH     0.5092      0.3648  
     5.59      1.75  
          
Adj.  R-sq.  0.7321 0.7458 0.7908    0.7250 0.7332 0.7729   
N  642 563 520 427 155 135 122  97 
Notes:  See notes to Table 1. In Model 1A we include LNETMARRY as a regressor in addition to those in model 1. In all regressions the dependent variable is averaged over a 5-
years lead period. The 2SLS regressions account for the endogeneity of both LGDPN and LNETMARRY since Hausman's test rejects the exogeneity of LGDPN and 
LNETMARRY, but not of LPEN.  Instrumental variables include, in addition to exogenous structural regressors, LAGE, LSEX, MATURE, MATURESQ, LPOP65, LINFLA, NX, 
LM2, and LPUBED. Models 4, 4A, 5, and 6 repeat the specifications of models 1, 1A, 2 and 3 using non-overlapping 5-year periods. Table 3.  Savings Regressions 
                               F i x e d   E f f e c t s   M o d e l s  
  LI LSAV 
  Model 1  Model 1A  Model 2  Model 2A  Model 3  Model 4  Model 4A  Model 5  Model 5A  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 
        Non-overlap Non-overlap  Non-overlap Non-overlap Non-overlap  Non-overlap 
              
PEN  -2.4082 -0.7761 -0.6340 -1.8257 -2.9755 -3.1577 -1.6013 -0.8616 -2.5400 -9.0584 -1.2353  -2.4189 
  -8.74 -2.28 -1.98 -3.02 -2.78 -4.56 -1.70 -0.89 -1.38 -2.91 -2.74  -2.54 
  [-0.135] [-0.044] [-0.036] [-0.102]  [-0.167] [-0.177] [-0.090] [-0.048] [-0.142]  [-0.507] [-0.069] [-0.135] 
LPi1  -0.9699 -1.5195 -0.6882 -0.6048 -2.6144 -0.9256 -1.6446 -1.8057 -1.6845 -2.8078 -2.9583  -2.1516 
  -3.32 -3.30 -1.48 -1.30 -5.28 -1.54 -1.59 -1.59 -1.48 -2.35 -6.14  -2.57 
LPi2  0.1619 0.0895 0.0619 0.0496 0.0373 0.2799 0.1865 0.1551 0.1370 0.1945 0.2134  0.2654 
  4.53 2.29 1.62 1.29 0.93 2.74 1.53 1.28 1.12 1.52 3.62  1.86 
LG  -0.0030 0.0288 0.0209 0.0401 0.0481 0.0198 0.0215 -0.0274  -0.0117  -0.1938 0.2869  0.2352 
  -0.07 0.67 0.44 0.83 1.01 0.22 0.23 -0.18 -0.08 -1.27 4.23  1.92 
DEFICIT  -0.0058 -0.0030 -0.0097 -0.0095 -0.0062 -0.0099 -0.0074 -0.0125 -0.0123 -0.0054    
  -2.81 -1.29 -3.84 -3.79 -2.48 -2.06 -1.35 -1.97 -1.94 -0.90    
NX  -0.0172 -0.0171 -0.0181 -0.0184 -0.0177 -0.0251 -0.0245 -0.0224 -0.0231 -0.0175    
  -9.88 -8.22 -8.83 -9.01 -8.19 -5.92 -4.55 -4.12 -4.22 -3.10    
LGDPN  0.1544 0.1058 0.1952 0.1847 0.4144 0.2646 0.2240 0.3253 0.2948 0.5319 0.3426  0.3793 
  6.07 3.31 4.83 4.57 8.27 4.46 2.89 2.99 2.63 3.95 8.50  4.71 
LNETMARRY   0.1705  0.1879  0.1018  0.2694  0.1471  0.1445  0.0192  -0.0634    
    6.98 7.24 2.25 4.97    2.15 1.82 0.14 -0.40     
LFLFP     0.0371  0.0435      -0.0524  -0.0357     
     0.85  1.00      -0.43  -0.29     
LFSCH     -0.1056  -0.1296      -0.3391  -0.3756     
     -0.83  -1.02      -1.09  -1.20      
LM2     -0.0235  -0.0251      -0.0235  -0.0229     
     -3.32  -3.54      -1.33  -1.30      
LINFLA     -0.0003  -0.0001      -0.0037  -0.0028     
     -0.03  -0.01      -0.19  -0.14      
NETMARRY*PEN      0.1727       0.2375     
      2.32       1.07     
Adj.  R-sq.  0.2684 0.3452 0.4301 0.4367    0.3790 0.4058 0.5095 0.5182    0.1173 0.1854 
N  784 631 508 508 507 173 137 110 110 109 782 173 
Notes:  See notes for Table 1.  The 2SLS regressions account for the endogeneity of only LGDPN since Hausman's test rejects the exogeneity of LGDPN, but not of PEN or 
LNETMARRY. Instrumental variables include, in addition to exogenous structural regressors, LAGE, LSEX, MATURE, MATURESQ, LPOP65, LINFLA, NX, LM2, and 
LPUBED. Model 4, 4A, 5, 5A and 6 repeat the specification of model 1, 1A, 2, 2Aand 3 using non-overlapping 5-year periods.  Models 7 and 8 are restricted regressions using as 
dependent variable LSAV where SAV = I+DEFICIT+NX, based on overlapping and non-overlapping 5-year periods, respectively. Table 4.  Per Capita GDP Growth Regressions 
  A. IINTERMEDIATE  (5-yr-lead) GROWTH RATES (see eq. 21)      B. SAMPLE-PERIOD GROWTH RATE  (see eq. 24) 
  Model 1  Model 1B  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6    Model 1  Model 1B Model 2  Model 3A Model 3 
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Constant  -0.0278
†  0.0443  0.0070
† 0.0251
† 0.0102
†  -0.0877  0.1196
†   T  -0.0003
†† 0.0552 0.03142 0.0988  0.0438 
    6.96            18.80 2.93 16.26 4.81 
LPEN  -0.0075 -0.0017 -0.0035 -0.0287 -0.0078 -0.0086 -0.0241   T*LPEN  -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0017 -0.0017 
  -5.39 -3.88 -1.98 -3.87 -2.13 -1.75 -1.66    -7.09  -11.26  -3.74 -5.54 -5.08 
LPi1  -0.1662 0.0134 -0.0425 0.4166 -0.0837 -0.1733 0.1175   T*Lpi1  -0.1138 0.0613 0.0340 0.0610 0.0287 
  -3.75 0.45 -0.60 4.28 -0.96 -1.21 0.64  -8.82 3.51 1.21 2.31 0.92 
LPi2  0.0380 0.0210 0.0214 0.0098 0.0482 0.0632 0.0629   T*Lpi2  -0.0013 0.0036 0.0041 0.0058 0.0045 
  7.15 5.42 3.03 1.03 3.88 3.49 3.01  -1.36 2.63 2.32 2.89 2.40 
LG  0.0153 -0.0043 0.0244 0.0136 0.0032 0.0124 0.0033   T*LG  -0.0116 -0.0111 -0.0111 -0.0218 -0.0138 
  2.91 -2.06 3.17 1.52 0.29 0.69 0.19  -9.11 -11.08 -7.21 -13.46 -8.37 
LSCHYR     -0.0414  -0.0486    0.0007  -0.0445   T*LSCHYR     -0.0016  -0.0057  0.0039 
     -4.47  -2.11    0.08  -1.02     -0.85  -2.99  1.71 
LNETMARRY     0.0018  -0.0064  0.0007  -0.0287   T*LNETMARRY     0.0048  0.0063 
     0.47  -1.69  0.08  -3.31     3.76  3.79 
LFLFP     0.0074    0.0232    T*LFLFP     0.0049    
     0.94     1.48       2.63    
LFSCH     0.0006    0.0753    T*LFSCH     -0.0368    
     0.03     2.14       -9.53    
Adj. R-sq.  0.1699 0.0624 0.1706    0.1949 0.2446     Adj. R-sq.  0.9411 0.7870 0.8264     
N  928 928 644 527 206 143 111   N  1333  1333  752 729 587 
Notes: See notes to Table 1. The regressions in Part A implement regression specification (21), with the dependent variable measured as the average growth rate of GDPN over a 5-
year lead (“Intermediate Growth”) period.  The results for country dummies are suppressed.  Here estimated coefficients represent elasticity terms. Models 1 and 1B are regressions 
with and without fixed-effects. Models 3 and 6 account for the endogeneity of LPEN and LSCHYR, but not LNETMARRY, based on the Hausman’s test results. Instrumental 
variables include, in addition to exogenous structural regressors, LSEX, LAGE, MATURE, MATURESQ, LPOP65, LINFLA, NX, LM2, and LPUBED. Models 4, 5, and 6 repeat 
the specifications of model 1, 2 and 3 based on non-overlapping 5-year periods. In Part B we implement the “long-term growth” regression specification of equation (24). In model 
1, we enter both country-dummies and their interaction terms with T as additional regressors. Models 3A and 3 report 2SLS regression estimates accounting for the endogeneity of 
LPEN, LSCHYR and LNETMARRY since Hausman's test rejects their exogeneity. We use here the same set of instrumental variables used in model 3 of Part A. 
† = Coefficient 
representing the mean value of constant terms of all country dummies. 
†† = Coefficient representing the mean value of the interaction terms of T and all country dummies. Table A.  Additional Sensitivity Tests 
(1)  Human capital formation regressions 
  SCHYRGTH SECGTH SCOREGTH    LSCHYR  LSEC  LSCORE 
            LPEN  -0.0014  -0.0020  0.0026            T*LPEN  -0.0007  -0.0024  -0.0020 
 -3.79  -4.00  1.19  -4.40  -11.30  -4.84 
(2)  Provident funds v. PAYG systems  
 LNETMARRY  LMARRY  LDIVORCE  LTFR  LI  5-YR  GROWTH  LT  GROWTH 
[Provident Funds] 
PEN  -0.0826 -4.3476 -0.2276 0.7515 0.8148 -0.0043 -0.0041 
  -0.12 -5.79 -0.25 1.27 1.13 -0.57 -2.22 
[Non Provident Funds] 
PEN  -7.0481 -4.3791 5.8500 -2.3912 -1.9553 -0.0075 -0.0021 
  -17.84  -16.91 9.30 -8.17 -6.86 -5.15  -12.56 
(3)  OECD v. Non-OECD countries 
 LNETMARRY  LMARRY  LDIVORCE  LTFR  LI  5-YR  GROWTH  LT  GROWTH 
[OECD]         
PEN  -5.7664 -3.1179 5.5751 -2.9549 -1.0299 -0.0099 -0.0040 
  -12.72  -11.54 7.94 -8.82 -4.85 -4.51  -16.09 
[Non OECD]         
PEN  -2.3173 -3.2162 0.2293 -0.0938 -0.0975 -0.0042 -0.0013 
  -4.18 -6.29 0.17 -0.16 -0.12 -1.83 -4.58 
(4)  Entering a Time Trend as added regressor 
 LNETMARRY  LMARRY  LDIVORCE  LTFR 
PEN  -4.9445 -3.6422 4.0050 -0.6745 
 -12.37  -13.38  6.00  -2.66 
(5) Correcting for autocorrelation AR(1) 
 LNETMARRY  LMARRY  LDIVORCE  LTFR 
PEN  -1.8900 -0.9551 0.8998 -0.2814 
  -6.69 -5.94 2.85 -2.31 
Note: This table shows estimates based on model 1 (OLS) regressions in Tables 1-4. For the long-term growth regressions results in parts (2) and (3) we report the coefficient 
associated with T*LPEN and PEN is entered in log form. The AR(1) coefficients applied to the NETMARRY, LMARRY, LDIVORCE and LTFR regressions are 0.7991, 0.8308, 
0.8728, and 0.8859, respectively. 
 Table B.  Impact of Hypothetical Tax Reductions: Projections for the World and US Economies 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Actual mean 1961-91  Projected mean 
  
Reducing the sample mean tax rate  
by one percentage point
† 
Going back to the 1960 tax rate
† 
WORLD    From .056 to .046  From .056 to .0322 
Net Marriage Rate  8.35  9.01  9.93 
Total Fertility Rate  2.81  2.88  2.97 
Private Saving Rate  25.94  26.45  27.18 
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate  2.84 %  2.88%  2.96%  
Per Capita GDP
††  $10,452 $10,583  $10,824 
U.S.    From .0666 to .0566  From .0666 to .0459 
Net Marriage Rate  8.11  8.59  9.14 
Total Fertility Rate  2.17  2.24  2.31 
Private Saving Rate  18.72  18.91  19.12 
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate  1.81%  1.88%  1.96% 
Per Capita GDP
††  $17,594 $  17,691  $18,148 
Note: Projections for the “world” are based on regression estimated for the non-provident-fund sample in model 1 (OLS) of the relevant endogenous variables in Table A.  
Projections for the U.S. are based on the regressions estimated for the non-provident-fund sample of OECD countries in model 1 (OLS) of Table A.  The projections for the per-
capital GDP growth rate and per-capita GDP are based on the long-term growth regression results using LGDP as dependent variable. 
†    Average tax rate approximated by PEN = Pension benefits/GDP. 
†† This row shows the actual and predicted per capita GDP in 1991, rather than their mean values over 1961-91.  
 